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9There is nothing magic about one hundred years that
necessarily makes it appropriate as a period over which to
review either social policies or their results. Indeed, it is such a
long period that it is hard for those looking back with today’s
concerns and perspectives to understand the contexts within
which past policies developed or the ways in which past
problems were regarded and understood.
However, for those involved in the study of social problems
and policies in the UK, the last century does represent a unique
period over which we can think about ‘poverty and progress’
(or, at times, lack of progress). This is not just because of the
centenary of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s establishment,
which this book marks, but because Seebohm Rowntree’s study
of York in 1899, Poverty: A study of town life,1 gives us the key
starting point on which we can peg our understanding of
subsequent trends.
It is not our intention to give an evenly paced view of the last
century. Rather, it is to look at current concerns taking the
longer view of where we have come from – to understand the
present, in the light of the past, for the purposes of the future,
as John Maynard Keynes put it. In doing this, our perspective,
and the structure of the book, are like the famous New Yorker
cover of a New Yorker’s view of the USA, seen from Manhattan
– disproportionately dominated by what is nearest, with only a
little of what is between the two coasts showing up.
1 Introduction
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The whole idea of what poverty is and how to measure it has
changed a great deal in the past century, although many of the
basic issues remain remarkably familiar. We have not attempted
to trace this debate in detail, not least because it has been done
by others, notably Ruth Lister (2004) in her recent book.
However, social scientists’ work in measuring and
conceptualising poverty has had an impact on policy, and we
discuss this at various stages in our account.
In chapter 2, Howard Glennerster sets out the context within
which Rowntree carried out his study with the earlier
development of empirical investigation by Charles Booth and
others, and discusses some of Rowntree’s lasting insights.
In chapter 3, David Piachaud and Jo Webb use the evidence
from Rowntree’s 1899 study of York to try to understand how
what we mean by ‘poverty’ has changed over the last century.
What does Rowntree’s poverty line mean in today’s terms? How
do the causes of poverty a century ago compare with its causes
today, and what are the key social and economic changes that
have led to such differences? In chapter 4 they use evidence not
just from Rowntree’s three studies of York in 1899, 1936 and
1950, but from a series of other studies both before and after
the Second World War, to examine the way in which what was
seen as an appropriate ‘poverty line’ changed over the
twentieth century, and what this tells us about the changing
extent of poverty over the period.2
The second part of the book traces the evolution of policy
towards poverty over the century. In chapter 5, Howard
Glennerster starts by describing the roots of policy in the poor
law tradition, and developments following Rowntree’s and
Booth’s studies. He takes the story from the reforms of Lloyd
George, through the post-war reforms associated with (but not
always following from) the 1942 Beveridge Report, and the
optimism generated by Rowntree’s final study to the
‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1960s, and what some have
described as the ‘end of consensus’ in the 1970s.
In chapter 6, John Hills looks at much more recent
Introduction
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developments since inequality and relative poverty started
rising in the late 1970s, reviewing policy developments and
poverty outcomes under the governments led by Margaret
Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair.3
The last parts of the book look to the future. In chapter 7,
John Hills first sets out where Britain now stands in
international terms, not just against our own past. While there
have been improvements in the most recent period, particularly
in respect of child poverty, Britain’s position does not compare
well with many other countries at a similar level of
development. Second, he looks at what constraints and
challenges public opinion places on today’s policy makers.
Third, he looks back a shorter period to the findings of the 1995
Joseph Rowntree Foundation Inquiry into Income and Wealth
to see which parts of the agenda set out by the Foundation’s
Inquiry Group have since been adopted, and which others may
still have relevance today. Fourth, he discusses a key part of the
context within which future policies will develop – the
economic and demographic pressures that will face any British
government in the coming decades.
Finally, in chapter 8 we reflect on the policy choices and
dilemmas we face today in thinking about policies aimed at
reducing poverty and disadvantage, in the light of where we
started from a hundred years ago.

Part I
Poverty over the last century
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As two American economists have recently shown, the very
different approaches societies have taken to fighting poverty
lie deep in institutional history, rather than in current
economics (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). This is well illustrated in
Britain’s distinctive history. The moral and political dilemmas
posed by the poor had troubled politicians, social
commentators and theologians from the Middle Ages and
indeed before. The coming of modern ‘political economy’ and
demography at the end of the eighteenth century, most
notably in the writings of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus,
added a tougher and more ruthless logic to the debate. Poverty
and starvation might be necessary for population control; ‘the
scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further
multiplication of the human species,’ as Adam Smith put it
(1776, p.182).
The need to contain poor relief1 and how it should be done
was a recurrent theme of public debate through the nineteenth
century (see chapter 5). By the century’s end, however, it was
becoming clear to many that the existing order was not able to
cope with the demands placed on it by the new international
industrial economy in which the United Kingdom played a
central part. Many argued that there was a hard core of poverty
that was self imposed through wilful indolence and drink.
Neither Charles Booth nor Seebohm Rowntree disagreed. But
there was also an appreciation that there were growing
2 The context for Rowntree’s
contribution
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numbers of people whose poverty could not be blamed on
individual failings. The prolonged ‘unemployment’ of the 1880s
– a new term at that time (Harris, 1972) – or the Lancashire
cotton famine, could not be blamed on a few feckless men and
women. Fecklessness hardly went in cycles. The Poor Law was
becoming a mainline provider of care to the growing
population of elderly women, and of financial support to
widows (though eligibility varied widely) and to the sick. It was
also a major provider of education and care for poor children. 
The Poor Law is at the present time only to a small extent
concerned with the man who is able-bodied. The various
sections of the non-able-bodied – the children, the sick,
the mentally defective, and the aged and infirm – make up
today nine-tenths of the persons relieved by the
Destitution Authorities. 
(Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor
Laws and the Relief of Distress, 1905–9, p. 1)
Homeless people congregating under a bridge in London, 1870, from the book
London, a Pilgrimage by Gustav Doré.  People both pitied and feared the poor in the
mid nineteenth century.
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Appreciating that the old institutions were simply not designed
to cope with the new situation took a long time. It was a view
vigorously opposed by those in the Local Government Board
and the philanthropic Charity Organisation Society whose
remedy was to tighten up the way the Poor Law was
administered. In 1869 the Poor Law guardians were urged to
return to the principles of 1834 and relieve ‘able-bodied
paupers’ only in the workhouse. But the condition of the poor,
notably in London, was increasingly becoming both a moral
question and a fearful one. The violent demonstrations of the
mid 1880s created a fertile ground for descriptions and
explanations of what was happening. Poverty in London had
been the subject of careful descriptive writing by Henry
Mayhew (1861–2) and by others. But it was a powerful
pamphlet published by the Congregational Union, The bitter
‘The crippled street bird-seller’, an engraving from
Henry Mayhew’s influential work London labour
and the London poor (1861–2).  Mayhew’s work
was one of several bringing the poor to the
attention of nineteenth century political thinking.
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
One hundred years of poverty and policy
18
cry of outcast London: An inquiry into the condition of the
abject poor (1883), which sparked widespread attention in the
middle class magazines of the time. The working poor were
beginning to have their say in an organised way through trade
unions. It is at this time that a new social science of poverty
measurement begins to play a decisive part in shaping people’s
understanding and ultimately policy. 
Lifting the curtain: The contribution of nineteenth 
century social science
The Bitter cry was an emotional pen portrait. Was it right? Or
was it an overblown and unhelpful description that would lead
sober reformers in the wrong direction? That is what Charles
Booth initially thought. 
East London lay hidden behind a curtain on which were
painted terrible pictures: starving children, suffering
women, overworked men; monsters and demons of
inhumanity; giants of disease and despair. Did these pictures
truly represent what lay behind, or did they bear to the
facts a relation similar to that which the pictures outside a
booth at some country fair bear to the performance or
show within? This curtain we have tried to lift. 
(Booth, quoted in Abbott, 1917)
His painstaking house by house survey in East London was first
reported to meetings of the Royal Statistical Society. It was
extended to most of inner London. The accounts of the
economic life of each area, the temporary nature of much
employment and the low wages even regular employment
could generate presented a convincing and much publicised
picture. It was not just an attempt to measure the numerical
extent of poverty but a mapping of the gradations of human
inequality. It was grounded in the local economy of small areas
of London. The notion of an inner core of poverty and
movements in and out of such areas, which urban sociologists
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came to refine, are first charted here (Booth, 1888, 1891,
1892–7). 
Charles Booth’s line of poverty
Booth’s most lasting contribution was the means he adopted to
provide a definitive answer to the question: were these merely
exaggerated journalistic accounts of poverty and distress or
were they grounded in solid evidence? In that sense he can be
seen as the father of modern poverty study. Booth himself was
very sceptical of the claims being made. He changed his mind.
The evidence amassed by his investigators convinced him, and
his audience at the Royal Statistical Society was not surprised. 
The survey method he used was by no means modern. He relied
on information supplied by and judgements made by local
investigators such as the School Board visitors in East London.
They went to every family with children of school age. It was
assumed that the other half of the working class population
was in a similar state. Other volunteers supplemented the work,
especially outside the East End. These were not questionnaires
filled in or responded to by heads of household. But his
assistants were asked to grade their households into what were
essentially social groups. 
He was not very forthcoming about how he reached the ‘line
of poverty’ used by his investigators. 
”By the word poor I mean to describe those who have a
fairly regular though bare income, such as 18s to 21s per
week for a moderate family, and by ‘very poor’ those who
fall below this standard, whether from chronic irregularity
of work, sickness, or a large number of young children.” 
(Booth’s account of his methods given at a meeting of the
Royal Statistical Society, May 1887, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, June 1887; Simey and Simey, 1960, p. 184)
Where on earth did this income level come from? It was much
higher than the rates of outdoor relief that the Select
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
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Committee on Poor Relief found in existence in the London of
1888 – an average of 9s 4d (47 new pence) for a family of five.
This varied by area and reflected local labour markets. The Poor
Law officials asked themselves what was the minimum market
wage and how much below it did you need to pay to contain
Part of Charles Booth’s 1889 ‘poverty map’ of London.  Booth’s team of investigators
graded each household into social groups, and although the reasoning behind their
judgements was not rigorously scientific, the overall pattern of income and poverty
showed large areas of chronic need.
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the number of paupers? – a test of destitution. What Booth did
was to set a rough income level that reflected a judgement
about its social acceptability. This was a decisive contribution. 
But whose judgement? Recent research suggests it was more
firmly grounded than many critics have implied (Gillie, 1996).
The source may well have been the fee remission scales used by
the London School Board in Tower Hamlets at the time Booth
was studying the area. Under the 1870 Education Act it was
possible for local boards to make attendance at school
compulsory. They were also required to charge fees. That posed
difficulties. How far was it reasonable to reduce poor families’
incomes? Was there a floor below which it would be
irresponsible to do so? Boards in different cities reached their
own conclusions about fee remission and kept their yardsticks
secret. So did the Tower Hamlets divisional office. But officers
had precise guidance about the income at which a prima facie
case could be made that it would be socially unacceptable and
prejudicial to a child to reduce the family income below that
point. Guidance took into account the size of the family and
the level of rent paid. It had all the characteristics of modern
income support minima and the result was a net income very
near to the one Booth chose. He would not have been able to
cite this as his source as the Education Board insisted such a
scale be kept secret. If this intriguing possibility is correct, the
first statistical/social judgement on income adequacy used by
Booth may well have been based on a real life judgement by
these school board members. But it was not one that could be
debated or challenged. This was Seebohm Rowntree’s critical
contribution. 
Rowntree’s poverty line
Seebohm’s father, Joseph Rowntree, had studied social
questions, including ‘Pauperism’, before Seebohm was born.
Seebohm was powerfully affected by a visit to the poorest parts
of Newcastle. He discovered Booth’s work and wondered if his
findings would hold outside London. ‘Why not investigate
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
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York?’ (Briggs, 1961, p. 17). The methods he used were, at one
level, similar to Booth’s. House to house visits produced sheets
of notes about the accommodation, the numbers in the family
and their working occupations and personal remarks about the
standard of life, cleanliness and respectability of the
inhabitants. The household’s broad band of income was mostly
estimated from knowledge of the worker’s job and the wages
paid for that job obtained from the employer. Sometimes the
investigator had to rely on the families’ own information
checked with other observations or a second visit. In addition
the investigator was asked to judge from observation,
questioning neighbours or members of the family whether, in
their view, the family was living in ‘obvious want and squalor’.
It was this personal judgemental approach that led to the often
quoted conclusion that 28 per cent of the total population of
York were living in such a state. That compared with the 31 per
cent Booth had judged to be in poverty in London. Booth
agreed that Rowntree’s figures were comparable to his own
(Rowntree, 1901; 2001, p. 300).
Whether they really were is a moot point. Helen Bosanquet,
of the Charity Organisation Society and member of the Royal
Commission on the Poor Laws, questioned why Rowntree’s
survey of a relatively prosperous market town like York should
produce the same result as Booth in the depressed East End of
London (Bosanquet, 1903; for an account of contemporary
critics see Bowpitt, 2000). 
What was new, and was to have a long term impact on
poverty measurement, was his attempt to measure the causes
of poverty. Rowntree distinguished those whose income was so
low that even if they followed complete sobriety and total
purchasing efficiency they would not be able to live at a level
of ‘physical efficiency’. 
His attempts here have often been misunderstood. He knew
that any figure was likely to be attacked, as it was to be by the
Charity Organisation Society and others. So he sought a harder,
he hoped unchallengeable, measure. The adviser he turned to
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was an American who was working for the US Department of
Agriculture, Professor W. O. Atwater, whose specialist area was
human nutrition and energy, backed up by two nutritionists
from Scotland. How much food of what kind did a working
man need to function as an effective worker? That depended
on the type of work he was doing, Atwater argued, and he
produced a range of minimum diets from that needed by
workers who used little physical exercise, through moderate to
active muscular work. The moderate standard was chosen. 
Then Rowntree switched to actual food budgets. Here he
took the rations set out by the Local Government Board
recommended for those in workhouses, and the cheapest one
at that. They seemed to produce a diet consistent with the
nutritional level proposed by Atwater for men. The rations for
women and children could be roughly adopted and turned into
a household budget by using prices available to the working
class in York and checked against actual working class diets in
York and those of American workers. He concluded that ‘the
labouring classes on whom the bulk of the muscular work falls,
are seriously underfed’ (1901, p. 259). 
What Rowntree was doing was essentially to throw down the
gauntlet and challenge his critics: ‘Are you seriously suggesting
that you can expect families to live on less than this?’ It was this
harsher, apparently more ‘scientific’, measure he called ‘primary
poverty’.
The difference between the judgemental levels of ‘squalid
living’ and his primary poverty level formed the controversial
gap he called ‘secondary poverty’. These were ‘families whose
total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of
merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it is
absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful’
(1901, p. 115; emphasis in the original). Only 10 per cent of the
York population were living in primary poverty, or 15 per cent
of the wage earning class. 
The physical efficiency claim that underpinned the primary
poverty idea had an immediate appeal because of the growing
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
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Box 1 The life cycle of poverty
Rowntree described a life cycle of poverty as follows:
The life of a labourer is marked by five alternating
periods of want and comparative plenty. During early
childhood, unless his father is a skilled worker, he
probably will be in poverty; this will last until he, or
some of his brothers or sisters, begin to earn money and
thus augment their father’s wage sufficiently to raise
the family above the poverty line. Then follows the
period during which he is earning money and living
under his parent’s roof; for some portion of this period
he will be earning more money than is required for
lodging, food, and clothes. This is his chance to save
money. If he has saved enough to pay for furnishing a
cottage, this period of comparative prosperity may
continue after marriage until he has two or three
children, when poverty will again overtake him. This
period of poverty will last perhaps for ten years, i.e.
until the first child is fourteen years old and begins to
earn wages; but if there are more than three children it
may last longer. While the children are earning, and
before they leave home to marry, the man enjoys
another period of prosperity – possibly, however, only to
sink back again into poverty when his children have
married and left him, and he himself is too old to work,
for his income has never permitted his saving enough
for him and his wife to live upon for more than a very
short time.
A labourer is thus in poverty, and therefore
underfed – 
(a) In childhood – when his constitution is being built
up.
(b) In early middle life – when he should be in his prime.
(c) In old age.
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debate in the late 1890s about ‘national efficiency’. Those on
such wages could not be fully productive workers was the
implication. Veit-Wilson (1986) argues that it is the visible life
style of want and squalor that was really at the centre of
Rowntree’s moral concern. No one could really be expected to
live on his primary poverty income in real social life. Social
pressures, to drink in the local pub, to buy presents for the
children, to be a normal social being especially in adversity,
required a higher budget. This was the burden of Townsend’s
later critique (1954, 1962, 1979). 
That may be so, but what gave Rowntree his supposed
authority was the emphasis he placed on diet and household
budgets, which take up much of the book and its appendices. It
was this idea that appealed to later investigators, as Veit-
Wilson (1994) points out, and they made studies of other
English cities, to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Rowntree himself developed a more generous measure in his
‘human needs of labour’ study (1918), as we shall see. And by
the time of his second survey of York in 1936 (Rowntree, 1941),
Rowntree had abandoned the idea of secondary poverty: 
In this survey I have made no attempt to measure the
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
(Box 1 continued)
Rowntree’s picture of poverty over the life cycle
Source: Rowntree (1901), p.137.
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amount of ‘secondary’ poverty by direct observation, partly
because the methods of doing this adopted in 1899 appear
to me now as being too rough to give reliable results, and
also because even had I done so the results would not have
rendered possible a comparison with 1899 for ideas of what
constitutes ‘obvious want and squalor’ have changed
profoundly since then ... the only figures that are absolutely
comparable are those for primary poverty. 
(1941, p. 461)
Whatever Rowntree’s original intentions then, the idea of
poverty measures based on diet and physical efficiency had
taken on a life of its own. 
A crucial insight: The life cycle of poverty
What was equally important for future poverty study was
Rowntree’s attempt to unravel the causes of poverty. He
demonstrated that the rewards the labour market generated in
normal times were ill adapted to meet the basic needs of family
life for many of the working population, notably during
childrearing and widowhood, sickness and old age. Observing
from his returns the circumstances of families in poverty he
formulated his life cycle of poverty theory, going on to
elaborate it later in the The human needs of labour (Rowntree,
1918) (see box 1, pages 24–25). 
Wages, he argued, derived from the interaction of supply
and demand for particular skills. There was no reason why they
should take account of the fluctuating income needs of families
over their life cycle especially the coming of children or the
varying size of family. The significant activity of friendly
societies, Rowntree noted, helped to explain the low level of
primary poverty experienced from sickness and old age. The
economy was prospering at the top of the economic cycle. The
level of wages relative to the needs of a family with several
children was simply too low to meet the most basic nutritional
needs of many families. 
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Women’s contribution
The attention Booth and Rowntree’s work has attracted has
tended to obscure important research done at the time by
women’s groups, such as the Fabian Women’s Group and others
who were involved in the Suffragette Movement. Much of their
work was qualitative and it explored the meaning and
experience of poverty for individual family members and
notably women. It was influential because it gave an accessible
parallel account to that of Rowntree. It provided accounts of
the way in which women struggled to cope on below poverty
wages. It also raised issues about the distribution of income
within families that feminists were to rediscover in the 1980s.
An example was Mrs Pember Reeves’ (1914) Fabian
pamphlet, Family Life on a Pound a Week. It set out to answer
the question ‘How does a Lambeth working man’s wife with
four children manage on a pound a week?’ The answer differed
not least because the dietary (and other!) demands of men
varied and what was left determined what was available for
the children’s and the wife’s needs. This was the era of the male
breadwinner family but many women were also single and had
family responsibilities of various kinds – more, these studies
found, than Rowntree had claimed. It was an era of significant
widowhood. Poverty has not become feminised – it always was
(Lewis and Piachaud, 1992). 
In short, new social science evidence was posing an alternative to
the traditional view of poverty that it was the result of personal
failing and could be countered only by personal change which
required the absence of easy state poor relief. Explanations we
are familiar with today – unemployment generated by economic
cycles, the changing needs of families over their life cycle and the
rigidity of wages compared to changing family needs over a life
time – were already formulated. So, too, were the distinctive
needs of the sick, the old and those with long term disabilities
who could not be blamed for their situation. Social scientists and
actuarial statisticians were coming to see that individuals and
The context for Rowntree’s contribution
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families faced a range of economy-wide risks that it was very
difficult for them to insure against privately or collectively in
work-based or local self help societies. Some kinds of
employment or even location made the risks of ill health difficult
to insure against in small local or occupation-based
organisations. One way to see the history of the next half century
is the dawning realisation that there were fundamental market
and self help failures that required some kind of state action to
correct the causes of poverty. Incomes were too low and insecure
for many to save enough for their own retirement. Those most
prone to ill health were least likely to be able to sustain sick clubs
or private insurance without support. The ‘risk pool’ had to be
widened if families’ risks of poverty were to be minimised
(Johnson, 1996). Economy-wide solutions had to be found for
unemployment. Moreover, the scale and depth of each of these
groups’ risks were to change through the coming century.
Increasingly the politics of the twentieth century would become
concerned with the question – who should pay the costs of
sharing such risks (Baldwin, 1990)? Should it be the whole
community, the rich or only the working class? We trace threads
of that story in part 2. 
In the following chapters, however, we look at how Seebohm
Rowntree’s legacy of local poverty studies was continued up to
the Second World War and how the scale of poverty on
different measures changed over the century. We use the
analysis of the causes of poverty pioneered by Seebohm
Rowntree to examine how far those causes changed.
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Rowntree’s 1899 study provides a baseline for considering how
poverty has changed over the twentieth century. This chapter
reviews the main studies of poverty published in the twentieth
century and compares Rowntree’s first study based on his survey
of York in 1899 with evidence about poverty in Britain at the
start of the twenty-first century. In the next section these
studies are described and then the chapter examines how the
poverty lines or standards used in these studies compare and
how the extent of poverty has changed. In the next chapter the
changing causes of poverty are analysed. Examining changes in
poverty is purely descriptive and historical unless it illuminates
understanding of why changes occurred: some the main social
and economic changes that occurred over the century are
considered and their impact on poverty is discussed.
Poverty studies
Seebohm Rowntree’s Poverty: A study of town life was based on
York, the home of Rowntree and his family’s chocolate factory.
He wrote that ‘My object in undertaking the investigation . . .
was, if possible, to throw some light upon the conditions which
govern the life of the wage-earning classes in provincial towns,
and especially upon the problem of poverty’ (1901, p. vii).
Rowntree is best remembered for developing and formalising
the concept of the poverty line, collecting details about the
income of each household, rather than just making rough
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guesses, making a distinction between what he called ‘primary’
and ‘secondary’ poverty, and the concept of poverty over the
life cycle, as discussed in chapter 2. 
Subsequently other investigators followed in Rowntree’s
footsteps. In 1903 a survey which seems largely to have been
forgotten was carried out by Mann (1905). It is interesting since
it looked at a rural area, a village in Bedfordshire, whereas
almost all the other early surveys looked at towns. 
The next landmark in poverty studies was provided by
Bowley and Burnett-Hurst (1915, 1920), published under the
title Livelihood and poverty. The study covered five towns
(Reading, Northampton, Warrington, Stanley and Bolton) and
was carried out between 1912 and 1914. They followed
Rowntree’s broad approach but Bowley, a trained statistician at
the London School of Economics, pioneered the use of random
sampling, with far-reaching consequences. Abrams observed
that surveys ‘were no longer dependent on the munificence of
millionaire philanthropists and upon the years of toil of
wealthy amateurs’ (1951, p. 44). A follow-up to Livelihood and
A dole queue in 1911. As political concern about poverty increased, social security
was gradually extended, but was still often subject to stringent means tests.
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poverty carried out by Bowley and Hogg in 1923–4, published
under the title Has poverty diminished? (1925), dealt with a
subject of great contemporary interest, the difference between
the prewar and the post-war world. 
The biggest survey in the interwar period was the New
Survey of London Life and Labour directed by Hubert Llewellyn-
Smith (1930–5), which specifically aimed to provide a
comparison with Booth’s earlier study. 
There was a flurry of surveys in the 1930s, including surveys
of Sheffield (Owen, 1933), Merseyside (Jones, 1934),
Southampton (Ford, 1934), Plymouth (Taylor, 1938), and a
survey of Bristol (Tout, 1938), which was technically interesting
as probably the first in Britain to use the Hollerith punch-card
machine (Wardley and Woollard, 1994). 
Rowntree’s second survey of York, published as Poverty and
progress (1941), was particularly interesting since it showed
how much social conditions had changed between 1899 and
1936. Rowntree measured poverty according to several
different standards, the original 1899 level and a rather more
generous line based on his study of the Human needs of labour
(1937) – so this study looked forward as well as back. His third
survey in 1950, much smaller and less rigorous than his earlier
studies, found that poverty had been virtually abolished largely
as a result of the welfare state, an apparent achievement of the
Beveridge reforms which was widely reported. This was the last
of the old style local poverty surveys.
The introduction of the official Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) was a watershed for poverty research. This was carried out
on a one-off basis in 1953/54 and then on a continuous basis
from 1957 onwards. Its primary purpose is to collect
information about expenditure patterns which is used to
construct the Retail Price Index, but it also collected
information about household incomes. Initially this information
was fairly crude, but the questions became more detailed over
time. FES data could therefore be used to look at poverty at a
national level. The first to recognise and seize this opportunity
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were a group of academics based at the London School of
Economics. In the early 1960s Peter Townsend (1962) and
Dorothy Wedderburn (1962) presented some preliminary results
from an analysis of the FES for the years 1953/54 and 1960. The
final results were published with much publicity, and the linked
establishment of the Child Poverty Action Group, in December
1965 in a pamphlet by Abel-Smith and Townsend, called The
poor and the poorest. 
Many further analyses were conducted in the same mould
using the FES in the 1960s and 1970s, including those by
Atkinson (1969), Fiegehen, Lansley and Smith (1977) and
Beckerman and Clark (1982). 
Official statistics on low incomes became a regular series with
the publication of the Low Income Families estimates between
1972 and 1985 (DHSS, 1988). These were based on the FES and
the format of the analyses was very similar to those produced
by Abel-Smith and Townsend, although the word ‘poverty’ was
not mentioned. 
The current official statistics on low incomes can be found in
the annual Households Below Average Income (HBAI) report,
which began to be published in 1988 and replaced the official
Low Income Families series. Originally this used the FES but it is
now based on the larger, tailor-made Family Resources Survey
carried out on behalf of the Department for Work and
Pensions. As its name suggests, HBAI provides details about
various aspects of the lower half of the income distribution, but
many commentators have chosen 50 per cent of mean income
or 60 per cent of median income, as a convenient poverty line.
In 1999 this appeared to receive official endorsement in the
form of a set of poverty indicators published by the
government (DSS, 1999) and was used in the Public Service
Agreement target for cutting child poverty by one quarter by
2004/05. The latest target in the Child poverty review (HM
Treasury, 2004) is to halve child poverty defined as below 60 per
cent of median income level (before housing costs) by 2010/11
relative to the 1998/99 level.
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Poverty lines
There are many differences in the poverty studies mentioned
here: in who carried out and financed the surveys, the
population covered, sampling and survey size, sources of
information and their quality, response rates, and
representativeness.1 Most fundamental in describing poverty is
what is meant by ‘poverty’ – what line or standard was used.
The starting point is Rowntree.
Rowntree drew up his ‘primary’ poverty line, as described in
chapter 2, based in part on science and in part on observation.
The scientific input was from American nutritionists whose
research (however unethical in retrospect, being based on
involuntary convict subjects) indicated requirements for ‘the
maintenance of merely physical efficiency’. To this was added
the cost of clothing, light and fuel. 
On rents, Rowntree wrote:
In estimating the necessary minimum expenditure for rent,
I should have preferred to take some reliable standard of
accommodation required to maintain families of different
sizes in health, and then to take as the minimum
expenditure the average cost in York of such
accommodation. This course would, however, have assumed
that every family could obtain the needful minimum
accommodation, which is far from being the case.
In view, therefore, of the difficulty of forming an
estimate as above, the actual sums paid for rent have been
taken as the necessary minimum rent expenditure.
Extravagance in this item is very improbable, rent being
the first thing in which a poor family will try to economise. 
(1901, p. 106, emphasis in original)
This issue is still with us – exemplified by the continuing
struggles of the government to reform Housing Benefit. Most
subsequent studies of poverty have either included actual rents
in setting the poverty line or, with the same effect, studied
Changes in poverty
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incomes after housing costs. For comparability, the same will be
done here.
The table below shows the minimum necessary expenditures
per week in 1899.2
Food Sundries Total
Each adult 3s 2s 6d 5s 6d
Each child 2s 3d 7d 2s 10d
The diet this allowed was bleak indeed. It is set out in box 2. 
Box 2  Rowntree’s 1899 diet
For a man Rowntree’s 1899 diet comprised the following (the
days from Wednesday to Saturday were no different):
Breakfast Dinner Supper
Sunday Bread, 8 oz Boiled bacon, 3 oz Bread, 8 oz
Margarine, 1/2 oz Pease pudding, 12 oz Margarine, 1/2oz
Tea, 1 pt Cocoa, 1 pt
Monday Bread, 8 oz Potatoes with milk, 24 oz Bread, 8 oz
Porridge, 11/2 pts Bread, 2 oz Vegetable
Cheese, 2 oz broth, 1 pt
Cheese, 2 oz
Tuesday Porridge, 11/2 pts Vegetable broth, 1 pt Bread, 4 oz




The cost of some components of the diet then and now are also
shown in the box. Costing the weekly diet for a man and for
children aged 3–8 at today’s prices gives totals of £10.70 and
£5.60 per week respectively. The cost of the diet made up over
half of the total poverty line for adults and four-fifths of the
total for children.
Comparisons between the poverty lines used in other studies
are fraught with difficulty, due to differences in their structures
and lack of suitable price indices and measures of living
standards. The poverty lines used in the early studies are as
consistently as possible compared in figure 1; this relates to a
three-child family and is adjusted to the price levels of 2000. It
is clear that most of the early surveys used similar poverty lines
(Box 2 continued)
The table below compares the prices of food items in 1899 and
2004, expressed in current prices converted to (new) pence per
pound (2004 prices are April 2004 Waitrose prices, London).
1899 2004 Increase
Flour 0.48 15 31x
Oatmeal 0.83 34 41x
Cheese 2.71 212 78x
Sugar 0.73 31 42x
Potatoes 0.21 18 86x
Margarine 3.33 47 14x
Butter 5.0 141 28x
Biscuits 1.67 44 27x
Bacon 5.0 135 27x
Tea 7.08 307 43x
Coffee 5.0 899 180x
Treacle 0.73 79 108x
Onions 0.21 25 119x
Currants 1.46 97 67x
Milk (per pint) 0.63 30 48x
Changes in poverty
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in real terms and in structure. By the 1930s these lines were very
low in comparison with general living standards. The main
exception was Rowntree, who in his second and third studies
was much more generous than the rest.
In the second half of the century, benefit levels did not
change their structure much until very recently, with higher
allowances for children, especially younger ones. Means tested
social assistance benefits increased roughly in line with average
incomes until the early 1980s, and have risen sporadically since
then, as shown in figure 2. 
Overall, the derivation of poverty lines and the fine details of
their construction, such as the varying treatment of men,
women, pensioners, children and people of working age, have
changed over time, but the measures produced have been
surprisingly stable when viewed in relation to living standards.
In the first half of the century, poverty lines for a single man
were 30–35 per cent of weekly personal disposable income per
capita, while in the second half they were around 40 per cent,
as shown in figure 3 (page 40). For a three-child family there
was much more variation from about 80 to 140 percent of per
capita income.
We can compare Rowntree’s 1899 primary poverty level with
the equivalised 60 per cent of median income standard now
used by the government. The overall poverty levels have been
expressed as proportions of consumers’ expenditure per capita,
as shown in table 1. It can be seen that for all types of
household the poverty line has not only increased with rising
prosperity but has risen somewhat relative to average
expenditure levels. (It may be noted that the poverty line for
2001/02 is considerably higher than Income Support levels,
which are roughly similar proportions of average consumption
per head as were Rowntree’s primary poverty levels.)
At the end of the twentieth century, poverty lines were far
higher in absolute (real) terms than ever before, but in relative
terms they had changed rather little. All the evidence suggests
that over a long period of time, the public has regarded the
Changes in poverty



































































































































































































poverty line as a relative concept, i.e. bearing some relation to
general living standards although not necessarily rising quite as
fast as they do. Although social policy textbooks often talk
about ‘absolute’ versus ‘relative’ definitions of poverty, and the
person usually cited as an exponent of the former view is
Rowntree, this is a gross misrepresentation of his work. Budget
standards became stuck in a rut in the 1930s because
researchers were concentrating on making comparisons, either
with different places or different times, not because they were
seen as currently valid. Surveys of public opinion indicate that
over time, people’s views of necessities and the income required
to afford them do rise upwards as average incomes grow.3 As
Donnison said in 1982:
Supplementary benefit today is worth about twice as much
as national assistance was as recently as 1948. So why worry
about the poor? Poverty means exclusion from the living
standards, the life styles and the fellowship of one’s fellow
citizens. That exclusion is not experienced merely as a
frustrating failure to keep up with the Joneses. The assistant
secretary in charge of the campaign against fraud who
believed that everyone could manage perfectly well with an
income equivalent to the national assistance rates of his
boyhood on which his own parents lived had forgotten that
they had an open fire and probably a cooking range which
Changes in poverty
Table 1: Poverty lines as a proportion of consumers’ expenditure per
capita (%)
Single Couple, Couple, Couple, Couple, Single
person no one child two three person,
children (8–10) children children one child
1899 36 60 78 97 114 55
2001/02 42 76 93 111 128 59
Source: Piachaud (1988) for Rowntree’s 1899 ‘primary poverty’ line;
authors’ calculations for 2001/02.




























































































































































































































































































could burn all kinds of fuel. They were not compelled to live
in a flat with one of the more expensive forms of central
heating. They could probably grow vegetables in the back
garden, and walk to the shops every day – little shops which
would give you credit if you were short of cash. They had no
need of a refrigerator for storing their food. They could
hang out the washing in the yard and had no need of
launderettes or washing machines. Since no-one had
television sets their children would not have felt at a loss in
the playground and the classroom for lack of what has now
become most people’s main window on the world – almost
the only window for those who cannot afford to go
anywhere. 
(1982, p. 226)
Contemporary examples are the reduction in public telephone
booths due to the prevalence of mobile phones, and the much
wider range of information and services available to those with
internet access. 
The current poverty line based on a proportion of average
income is convenient to apply – particularly when making
international comparisons – and easy to understand, but its
apparent simplicity disguises a host of technical definitions and
implicit assumptions. It is possible to imagine a very rich society
where nobody lacked what people in any other society would
see as necessities and yet some people still had incomes below
half average. 
The modern approach to defining needs that is closest to
Rowntree’s method is the Budget Standard approach,
expounded most notably by Jonathan Bradshaw (1993). This
approach was for a long time associated with discredited
notions of ‘absolute’ poverty. But there is nothing intrinsically
absolute or fixed about it, although it is rather laborious to
update. It has the great advantage that it is explicit, and there
is no reason why the ‘necessities’ included should not change
over time.4
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Budget standards incorporating public opinion could be used
to supplement the 60 per cent of median income measure to
counteract the criticism that it is arbitrary and abstract. Such
standards have been constructed recently for several family
types, giving a detailed picture of what different households
need to achieve a particular standard of living in the UK at a
specific point in time. Far from Rowntree’s diet of cocoa, pease
pudding and boiled bacon, they take into account items
necessary for modern families, including childcare costs, which
made a big difference to the picture. These budgets have been
constructed after wide consultation with relevant groups, not
just by ‘experts’. 
It is striking that at the end of the twentieth century, budget
standards and 60 per cent of median income were producing
quite similar results despite being constructed in completely
different ways. The two approaches complement each other
well. One strategy would be that from time to time, budget
standards could be compared with average income to
determine what proportion of average income should be used
as the poverty line – a proportion that might gradually change
as time went on. The HBAI report could also discuss how the
poverty line translates in terms of living standards – a way of
putting flesh on the bones of the statistical calculations to make
them more meaningful. 
A problem which has been exacerbated in recent years is the
divergence between the poverty measure in common use and
the social security system. Some discrepancies may be justified:
for example, the benefit system uses the ‘inner family’ unit as
the benefit unit, whereas the HBAI series is based on
households. For the purposes of poverty measurement it is
probably fair to assume that most individuals in a household
share resources with each other, while for the benefit system to
make this assumption would be politically unacceptable. But
there is little rationale for other inconsistencies: 60 per cent of
median income is now considerably higher than benefit level
for most family types; clearly there is a serious gap between
43
what society and the government regard as an appropriate
poverty line and the standard of living it is prepared to grant in
practice to people receiving benefits. 
The changing extent of poverty
Rowntree’s study was confined to York. As Rowntree himself
put it: ‘One naturally asks on reading these figures [on poverty
in York] how far they represent the proportion of poverty in
other towns’ (1901, p. 298). He described York as ‘this typical
provincial town’ (p. 304) and before undertaking his study he
satisfied himself ‘that the conditions of life obtaining in my
native city of York were not exceptional, and that they might
be taken as representative of the condition existing in many, if
not most, of our provincial towns’. Comparing his results with
Booth’s earlier study of London, Rowntree wrote: ‘The
proportion of the population living in poverty in York may be
regarded as practically the same as in London’ (p. 299).
Jonathan Bradshaw in his preface to the centennial edition
of Rowntree’s study wrote: 
We concluded that Rowntree’s claim that conditions of life
in York were not exceptional and were fairly
representative is remarkably true of the city a century later
(with reservations on ethnic mix). In terms of the key
determinants of living standards, including rates of pay,
levels of unemployment, proportion of the population
who are sick or disabled, lone-parent families, retirement
pensioners or people who are in receipt of income-related
benefits, York is extraordinarily close to the national
average. 
(Rowntree, 2000, pp. lxv–lxvi)
Thus it seems justifiable to treat Rowntree’s study as broadly
representative of Britain and to compare poverty in York in
1899 with that in Britain at the end of the century – besides
which, we have no choice.
Changes in poverty




















































































































































































































































































































































Rowntree found that 9.9 per cent of York’s population were
below his primary poverty line, or living in ‘primary poverty’. In
addition nearly twice this proportion – 17.9 per cent – were
living above the poverty line but in ‘obvious want and squalor’,
which is Rowntree’s ‘secondary poverty’. Together this made a
total of 27.8 per cent living in poverty.
The extent of poverty found in subsequent studies up to
1937 is shown in figure 4, but with results adjusted to use the
same relative standard as the ‘primary poverty’ line in
Rowntree’s 1899 study. The broad picture is one of some decline
comparing the 1920s with the years before the First World War,
and higher rates of poverty in the early 1930s than in the 1920s.
Poverty in 1950 was underestimated by Rowntree, and it
increased during the 1950s, as Abel-Smith and Townsend
showed. Even then, it was at very low levels by modern
standards, affecting less than 4 per cent of the population if the
standard benefit level was used as the poverty line. Abel-Smith
and Townsend’s ‘rediscovery’ of poverty was in part due to the
Changes in poverty
Slums in York, a ‘typical provincial town’, circa 1900.  Seebohm Rowntree’s influential
work, Poverty: A study of town life (1901), measured, among other things, the cost of
‘mere physical subsistence’.  He produced measures of numbers in primary poverty
(below this level) and in secondary poverty (above this level but living in ‘squalor’),
attempting to take a more scientific approach to the study of poverty.
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Figure 5: Proportion of the population below 50 per cent mean income,
1961–99
























































Figure 6: Proportion of children living in households with incomes below
50 per cent of mean income, before housing costs, 1961–99


























































use of a higher poverty line, 140 per cent of the basic ‘scale
rates’ of benefit (on the basis that this allowed for other ‘extras’
people on National Assistance could get on top of scale rates),
which produced a poverty rate of 14.2 per cent. 
The 1960s and 1970s were a period of relative stability, with
poverty still in single figures on the standard benefit level
measure, and only around 10 per cent on a half mean income
measure. The extent of post-war poverty over the period for
which continuous data are available is shown in figure 5. The
great change came in the 1980s, when it doubled to roughly 20
per cent, and stayed there until the end of the century. The
period since the late 1970s is considered in more detail in
chapter 6.
Among children, the extent of poverty, as measured by their
family income level, was close to the average of all ages until
the 1980s. Since then child poverty has become markedly more
severe, as shown in figure 6.
In 2001/02, over one person in five (22 per cent) was living
below the poverty line of 60 per cent of median income level
(after housing costs). No attempt had been made since
Rowntree’s first study to measure secondary poverty since
doing so involved a highly subjective judgement on the part of
the researcher. This in part reflected the quest for objectivity in
poverty research but also the primacy given in twentieth
century social science to the quantitative over the qualitative.
Having considered the poverty lines used and the overall extent
of poverty in twentieth century Britain, it is to the changing




Rowntree distinguished six causes of poverty and divided those
in primary poverty according to these causes. The division is
shown in table 2. Over half the poor were in regular work but
at low wages.
To examine how far Rowntree’s ‘causes’ continue to explain
poverty, data from the Family Resources Survey for 2001/021
have been reanalysed using as far as possible the same
categories as Rowntree.2 The results in table 2 show important
changes. 
The biggest group in poverty remains households with
someone in work, but these account for only one third of those
now in poverty. Largeness of families (five or more children) has
greatly declined in significance from 22 to 2 per cent. Illness or
old age of the chief wage earner has grown in importance but
widowhood is less significant. Unemployment is now more
important than a century ago in explaining poverty. There is
now a large group whose poverty is not explained by any of
Rowntree’s causes; these include lone parent families, students
and others.
Counting how many fall below a poverty line gives a
measure of poverty but it does nothing to indicate the severity
of poverty; in a head count those a few pence below the
poverty line count equally with those far below the level. To
indicate severity it is possible to derive ‘poverty gaps’ which
measure the deficit below the poverty line. Rowntree
4 Why has poverty changed? 
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calculated these for each of his main categories of the poor. As
far as possible this has been reproduced for 2001/02. The results
are shown in table 3. In both years, the group falling farthest
below the poverty level was those in unemployed households,
still with an income less than half of the current poverty line.
The relative severity of poverty in households with one or more
in regular work was greater in 2001/02 than 1899. For widows
not only the incidence but also the severity of poverty had
diminished.
Taking the century as a whole, some conclusions can be
drawn about the composition of the poor and the causes of
poverty. Although surveys used different methods and poverty
lines, at any given time there was general agreement about the
leading cause. The earliest studies found that poverty was
mainly due to the combination of low wages and large families,
and child poverty rates were very high. In the 1920s and 1930s,
unemployment became a huge problem, and the unemployed
had a high risk of falling into poverty, despite unemployment
Table 2: Causes of poverty, 1899 and 2001/02





Death of chief wage earner 15.6 5.8 23.7
Illness or old age of chief wage earner 5.1 25.7 30.1
Chief wage earner out of work/
unemployed 2.3 8.6 73.0
Largeness of family 22.2 2.1 65.0
Irregularity of work 2.8 } 31.0 } 11.1In regular work but at low wage 52.0
Other – 26.8 52.5
All causes 100.0 100.0 22.0
Source: Rowntree (1901), p.120; authors’ calculations using Family
Resources Survey, 2001/02, see notes 1 and 2 to this chapter.
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insurance and assistance. After the war, family allowances
eased the problem of low wages, and unemployment was very
low. The largest group in poverty in the 1950s and 1960s were
the elderly, many of whom did not claim the National
Assistance to which they were entitled. When poverty was
‘rediscovered’ in the 1960s, public attention was drawn to the
plight of children in poverty. Pensioners were still more likely
than children to be poor, but the picture varies according to
which ‘equivalence scales’ we use to compare the incomes of
different kinds of family.
Pensioner poverty declined in the 1970s, due to increases in
the retirement pension. But in the 1980s, many groups were
affected by the great rise in poverty. Unemployment and lone
parenthood soared, and the risk of poverty was very high for
both of these groups. Today unemployment is lower but there
are many households with no adult in work, and child poverty
has become a major problem. There is now no single clear cause
of poverty but there is general concern about incentives to
work, with the introduction of measures to ‘make work pay’
and greater financial support for children (see chapter 6).
Is there still a life cycle of poverty?
Rowntree’s life cycle of poverty, one of his key concepts which
had an enduring impact on social security policy in the
Table 3: Poverty gaps as a percentage of the poverty line
1899 2001/02
Death of chief wage earner } 36.9 25.2Illness or old age of chief wage earner 26.6
Chief wage earner out of work/unemployed 83.6 51.6
Largeness of family 10.0 19.0
Irregularity of work 31.1 } 41.1In regular work but at low wages 24.8
Source: Rowntree (1901), p.120; authors’ calculations using Family
Resources Survey, 2001/02, see notes 1 and 2 to this chapter.
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twentieth century, was discussed in chapter 2. Here we attempt
to examine how it changed over the century. He illustrated the
life cycle with the diagram shown in box 1 in chapter 2. It is
unclear how Rowntree constructed his diagram. It appears to
incorporate some adjustment for changing family size (or
equivalisation) over the life cycle since the poverty line is
constant across the age range. Since Rowntree was at that stage
not conversant or confident with sampling methods, it seems
unlikely that he was familiar with more sophisticated and
recent statistical procedures. It seems likely that he drew his
diagram without specific data, impressionistically by hand, to
illustrate the life cycle he had observed and discussed. Since
neither the data nor the researchers are any longer available,
we shall never know.
For comparison, the modern extent of a life cycle of poverty
has been explored, based an actual data, with results shown in
figure 7. There is still, despite extensive lifetime redistribution
of income through the social security and tax systems, a
significant variation of average income levels over the life cycle.
As can be seen, the extent of poverty is highest among children
and older people. This pattern is not very different from what
Rowntree found although there is not now the fall in income
level and rise in poverty associated with the period of having
many dependent children when aged between 25 and 45. 
A further difference between lifetime experiences of poverty
is that between men and women. In 1899 women made up
about 60 per cent of all poor adults. In 2001/02 women made
up 54 per cent of those aged 16 and over who were poor. Thus
women were and are more likely to be poor. However, as
stressed in Chapter 2 and considered by Lewis and Piachaud
(1992), it is misleading to refer to a ‘feminisation’ of poverty in
Britain – poverty has for a long time been feminised.
Social and economic changes
In this section some of the most significant and striking changes
over the century are considered. It is not possible to assess the















































































































































Per cent poor after housing costs
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impact of each of these changes on poverty but they do
indicate how some things have changed a lot, and some not
very much.
Population
York’s total population increased over the century – as did
Britain’s – but, owing to boundary changes, it is hard to be sure
how much. What is more relevant is the changing age structure.
This is shown in table 4.
What is apparent is the extent of the ‘ageing’ of the
population. In 1901 nearly one-third (31.4 per cent) was aged
under 15 compared to one-sixth (16.5 per cent) in 2001; those
aged 60 or over tripled from 7.2 per cent in 1901 to 21.9 per
cent in 2001. There has been a dramatic fall in infant and child
mortality, and those reaching middle age live longer.
The proportions of the population who were unmarried (40
per cent), married (52 per cent) and widowed (8 per cent) were
little different across the century but each category had changed.
Table 4: Age distribution of population, York
Age 1901 2001
(%) (%)










All ages 100.0 100.0
Note: 1901 data are for York County Borough, 2001 data for York Urban
Authority.
Source: Census 1901, p. 191; Census 2001, table KS02.
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In 2001 one-fifth of the currently unmarried were divorced, one
seventh of those married had been remarried, and 4 per cent of
those who were still legally married were separated.3
A third, clear change in population was that in 1901 0.9 per
cent of York’s population was born outside the British Isles; in
2001 this had increased to 4.7 per cent.4
Economic activity, occupations and earnings
The extent of economic activity and the principal occupations
of all adults (up to age 75 in 2001) are shown in table 5.
Among adult men there has been a striking fall in economic
activity: only 1 in 14 was not engaged in an occupation in 1901
compared with 1 in 3 in 2001. Among women the opposite has
occurred, with a rise from 31 per cent to 56 per cent in
occupations. There was a greater difference between
unmarried women and women who were married or widowed
in 1901; 61 per cent of the former were in employment
compared to 10 per cent of the latter. In 2001 this difference
was much smaller, with over 70 per cent of married women
with dependent children being economically active. The
combination of the decline in employment among older
workers, due to the growth in both early retirement and
numbers on disability benefits, and the rise in female
employment have had major consequences for the distribution
of incomes.
While economic activity changed greatly, the pattern of
earnings was much more stable. The share of employment
income in gross domestic product remained remarkably
constant – between 70 and 80 per cent – through the twentieth
century. The dispersion of earnings changed very little in the
first 70 years of the century (Thatcher, 1968); it fell during the
1970s and then increased from 1980 until the end of the
century (Atkinson, 2000).
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Pattern of expenditure
The distribution of expenditure in 1899 was most fully analysed
by Rowntree only for those on the lowest earnings; the results
are compared with results for a similar proportion of
households in 2001/02 in table 6.
By far the most striking change is that in food expenditure. In
1899 poorer households spent over half their income on food:
after rent, fuel and lighting, they had less than one quarter to
spend on other things. By contrast in 2001/02 nearly half was
spent on other things and food represented only one sixth of
total expenditure. Only 12 per cent was spent on non-basic other
things in 1899 whereas this had grown to 40 per cent in 2001/02.
Housing
Housing circumstances have changed drastically. First, there has
been a change in tenure. Rowntree described the working class
population of York in 1899 as tenants – without exception they
Table 5: Economic activity and occupations, York, 1901 and 2001
Males Females 
1901 2001 1901 2001
14+ 16–74 14+ 16–74
Percentages engaged in 
occupations 92.6 66.9 31.4 56.2
Distribution of occupations 
(% of all active)
Manufacturing 7.9 18.9 n.s. 6.4
Transport and communication 17.8 9.4 n.s. 4.1
Motor trade – 14.8 – 19.0
Construction 14.3 11.3 n.s. 1.8
Food, lodging and domestic services 12.1 5.0 55.0 8.6
Social services n.s. 10.6 n.s. 32.6
Other (incl. n.s.) 55.8 38.9 45.0 33.9
Note: n.s. is not specified.
Source: Census 1901, table 35A; Census 2001, table KS11b and c.
One hundred years of poverty and policy
56
rented their accommodation. Others in the ‘servant-keeping
class’ owned their own homes but he assumed that this did not
happen among the working class. In 2001 in York the tenure
groups were:
Owned outright 32.1%
Owned with mortgage 40.3%
Rented from local authority 10.5%
Rented from housing association 4.6%
Rented from private landlord 8.7%
Other 3.8%
Renting is now confined to one quarter of households and
many of the poor in 2001 are owner-occupiers.
A second major change has been in the quality of housing. In
1899 Rowntree found that over 20 per cent of houses in York
had to share a closet with another house, some sharing with
five or more other houses. These were not water closets but
Table 6: Distribution of expenditure (%)




Fuel and lighting 9 6
Clothing 6 6




1 Weekly earnings under 26 shillings. These constitute about 20% of all
households.
2 Average of lowest and second decile groups.
3 See section on housing.
Source: Rowntree (1901), p. 244; Family Spending 2001/02, Office for
National Statistics, 2003.
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mostly midden privies, essentially holes in the ground. Not all
houses had their own water supply, with 15 per cent sharing a
water tap.
Third, the density of living has been greatly reduced. It is not
that houses are much larger: in 1899 there were about 5 rooms
per household, compared to 5.3 in 2001 (although rooms may
be larger and what is counted as a room has changed slightly,
making precise comparison impossible). But the number in each
household has fallen markedly from a mean of 4 in 1899 to 2.4
in 2001. Whereas in 1899 nearly all households had more than
one member and most had dependent children, in 2001 nearly
a third of households had only one member, of which half were
pensioners, and only one fifth had dependent children.
Rents in 1899 amounted to 18 per cent of total expenditure
of the poorest fifth, as shown in table 6. Even in Rowntree’s
highest income group rents were 13 per cent of total
expenditure. The rent figure for 2001/02 in table 6 is based on
gross rent: taking into account housing benefit, rebates and
allowances, net rent for the lowest quintile amounted to only 6
per cent of expenditure.
Thus for poorer tenants the net cost of housing is now a
much lower burden than in Rowntree’s day, but rent levels vary
widely. Similarly, among owner-occupiers the cost of mortgage
interest is highly variable. In sum, while the quality of housing
has improved enormously, the variation in its cost has greatly
increased.
Consumer durables
Alongside the extension of owner-occupation, the acquisition
of consumer durables has increased the capital ownership of
virtually all households. In analysing consumer durables no
comparison is possible with 1899 since Rowntree did not
analyse their ownership – in most cases for the very good
reason that the products had yet to be invented. In 2001 the
proportions of households in Britain with different consumer
durables were as shown in table 7.
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The majority of the population had access to most of the
durables listed. In the case of cars there was more variation in
the distribution. In York in 2001 one-quarter (27.3 per cent) of
households had no car (or van), half (48.6 per cent) had one car,
one fifth (20.1 per cent) had two cars, and 1 in 25 (3.9 per cent)
had three or more cars.
The mass ownership of consumer durables, including by
those in the lowest fifth of income levels, represents an
economic and social transformation. How far they all improve
quality of life is open to debate. In the case of cars, the
consequences of non-ownership in terms of mobility and lack of
access to amenities, cheaper shopping and much else are
important. Lack of a car is far more common among poorer
households. But in terms of many of the accoutrements of
modern life in Britain the poor are not now far behind those
better off.
Dependence on one earner
In 1899 the earnings of households from paid work averaged 32
shillings a week. This was the total income for most households
(excluding payments by lodgers). The earnings were provided by:
Table 7: Access to consumer durables, bottom income quintile group,
2001/02 (%)







Car or van 59
Tumble dryer 49
Home computer 42
Note: Table shows bottom fifth by net equivalised income after 
housing costs. 
Source: DWP (2003a), appendix 3, table 3.1.
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Head of household (almost all male) 82%
Male supplementary earners 13%
Female supplementary earners 5%
Thus over four-fifths of household incomes came from one
earner – literally the breadwinner.
In 2001 the numbers of economically active persons in






Far more households have two or more earners than in 1899
but in addition far more have no earner at all. The widening of
the distribution of economic activity is the greatest single
change that has increased income inequality.
Poor relief, social security and redistribution
At the start of 1901 the York Poor Law Union provided at public
expense for 492 people in York Workhouse and for 1,049
through ‘outdoor relief’ – payments to people living in their
own homes. ‘Outdoor relief’ provided for 1.4 per cent of the
population at a cost of £5,950 (Rowntree, 1901, pp. 365–76);
thus, outdoor relief amounted to at most 0.4 per cent of
income from earnings in York.6
In 2001/02 in Britain, one tenth of households received over
half their income from income related benefits.7 While Income
Support amounted to 1.4 per cent of gross incomes, a more
relevant figure however is total state spending on all cash
benefits, which amounted to 12.7 per cent of gross income.8
The role of the state in providing incomes and relieving
poverty has changed beyond any possible imagining of
Seebohm Rowntree.
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Despite the tiny levels, by modern standards, of expenditure
on poor relief, some of the concerns then are all too familiar
now. In the final paragraph of his study, Rowntree wrote:
There is no doubt a considerable amount of abuse in
connection with the giving of out-relief – persons
receiving it who are not really destitute, or who have
relations who could and should maintain them, whilst
others receive it only to spend it upon drink. Not a few
such cases have come under the notice of the writer
during the course of the present investigation. This does
not, however, necessarily, nor in fact does it at all, reflect
upon the honesty or ability of the relieving officers. But
the number of these is inadequate, there being only two
for the whole city. The abuse points, however, to the
necessity of appointing a Superintendent Relieving
Officer, for it must be borne in mind that ill-administered
outdoor relief not only entails financial waste, but has a
serious demoralizing effect upon the community.
The next chapter turns to the solutions, albeit partial, that were
developed over the last century, both in attempting to reduce
poverty, and to cope with such concerns.
Part II
A century of policy responses
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Twentieth century Britain inherited a unique poor law
tradition, much derided and much misunderstood. Reformers in
the first half of the century tried to transform that poor law
tradition into a social insurance based model. With the
Beveridge Report of 1942 and the legislative changes of the
1940s, they seemed to have succeeded. Yet that was not to be.
The comprehensive post-war social insurance schemes never
eliminated poverty or major dependence on the old public
assistance tradition. At the end of the century a new modern
version of targeted aid to the poor emerged, including
supplementing the wages of the working poor.
As Jose Harris has put it:
From the 1900s onwards . . . the poor law system in Britain
was continually supplemented, and appeared eventually
to be ousted, by a series of alternative income-support
policies based largely on social insurance; the climax of this
process with the formal ‘abolition of the poor laws’ in
1948 was felt by many to be a defining moment in Britain’s
post-war history. Yet from the early 1960s, welfare
structures covertly bequeathed from the poor laws began
to re-emerge in British social policy as the major
instrument of publicly-funded income support; at the end
of the century Britain once again had the most profoundly
poor-type welfare system of any country in Europe. What
5 Poverty policy from 1900 to the
1970s
Howard Glennerster
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accounts for the strange survival of this supposedly much-
hated institution?’ 
(2002, p. 410)
In order to try to answer that question we need to reflect
briefly on the significance of that poor law tradition in Britain. 
The roots of poverty relief: A distinct tradition
The First Tudor poor laws date from 1495 when the dilemmas
posed by the poor were a topic of moral and political debate
across Europe (Innes, 1998, 1999; Michielse, 1990; Slack, 1988,
1990). What balance should be struck between private charity
and public concern for good order? 
Prior to that time the predominant view was that the poor
were a proper charitable concern of the faithful. Monasteries,
almshouses, guilds, donations to the poor of the parish were
private activities. The state confined itself to punishing
vagabonds. 
Rising concern for and fear of the poor and the need to think
rationally about some organised responses to poverty were
argued by Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) and
pioneered in both Catholic and Protestant European cities from
Ypres, Strasbourg and Geneva to Lyon and Tudor London. 
In contrast to the previous system of Christian charity and
the medieval view of poverty, the main characteristics of
the new approach to poor relief can be summarised as
follows: the social salvation of the recipients rather than
the spiritual salvation of the donors took precedence;
secular rather than church authorities became the central
agents of poor relief; the maze of independent
institutions was replaced by a central institution, the
‘common chest’; begging was prohibited, no longer an
accepted practice of the paupers Christi; and the central
concern was no longer benevolence but the subjection of 
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the poor to a systematic and disciplinarian program of
education and improvement. 
(Michielse, 1990, pp. 2–3)
In fact, the tension between deeply held Christian humanist
ideals and a realist appreciation that charity could go too far,
creating a pauper population, has been recurrent in debates
about poverty policy right up to the present. 
If these innovations and ideas were European-wide, England
came up with an unusual solution. A national framework of
duties was placed on parishes in their treatment of the poor in
1597 and 1601, though with considerable local discretion about
the means employed. Such an approach was not so different
from some other countries but the general power to levy a tax
to meet the expenses of poor relief was. The fact that this
taxing power was almost universally adopted by local parishes
meant England was following a distinctive route. It was much
criticised as taking away the personal responsibility to give and
leading to the excessive relief of the poor. It was wrong, critics
argued, because it embodied a ‘right to relief’ (Innes, 2002). 
Poor relief took less than 1 per cent of the GDP in 1696 and
rose to 2 per cent by 1800. The numbers covered probably rose
from about 3.5 per cent of the population in 1700 to 8 per cent
by mid century and 14 per cent by 1800 (Slack, 1990). It was the
consequent cost and the very existence of a national legislative
framework that attracted the attention of leading social
scientists of the day – not just Adam Smith and Malthus but a
whole range of serious commentators, political economists and
statisticians (Blaug, 1963; Dunkley, 1982; Horne, 1986; Innes,
1999). The concern was not just with the misguided actions of a
few local burghers, as critics saw it. It was a national issue.
Westminster chose to address the early nineteenth century
critics by tightening the rules of access in the famous 1834
reforms, but not by revoking the ultimate right to relief as
some had urged. It was outdoor relief, cash given outside the
demeaning and rigorous workhouse that was frowned upon. 
Poverty policy from 1900 to the 1970s
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The 1834 Act took poor relief out of the hands of amateurs,
creating a body of professional staff who served the new
amalgamated parish ‘unions’. It set out a national test of need,
requiring relief for the able-bodied only in the workhouse,
setting out regulations for the conduct of those institutions.
The level of relief was also set. It should be lower than the
standard of life that could be gained from the lowest wage the
market would offer outside. This principle of ‘less eligibility’
was not new, but it was given its classic articulation. It would be
wrong too to give the impression that these principles were
universally implemented. Local traditions, ideologies of relief
almost, the revenue available from the local rate and local
economic circumstances differed widely. The Webbs made this
point but there now is a vast modern literature on local poor
law diversity (see Webb and Webb, 1929; Kidd, 1999; King,
2000, for summaries).
The significance of national legislation and national
guidelines should not be underplayed, however. After a strong
upward trend in poor relief spending that had reached £7
million in 1830, slightly down on 1820, it fell to £4.6 million by
1840 despite a growing population, and the scale of relief in
The ‘Poor Law divorce’, 1846.  When people entered the workhouse, married couples
were forced to live and work separately.
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relation to size of the population went on falling until the late
part of the century. Moreover, in its concern to contain the scale
of relief, central government created the most centralised
national pattern of poverty relief anywhere in Europe. A
powerful group of poor law inspectors began to shape local
administration and did so through to the 1930s. This involved ‘a
degree of centralised bureaucratic control largely unknown in
the poor law systems of mainland Europe’ (Harris, 2002, p. 420).
There was still much local variation and variation in treatment
by types of client – a hierarchy of ‘deservingness’. But it was an
increasingly centrally regulated safety net that became, by
stages, a nationally administered and calculated safety net by
1948. This was again a step ahead of European countries and
North America. It was to have important implications for the
eventual fate of the social insurance model in the twentieth
century.
Those writing accounts of the history of social policy as
recently as the 1970s (Fraser, 1973) could present the story as
one of gradual ‘progress’ – the Poor Law in all its evil forms
gave way, in gradual stages, to a growing range of social
insurance schemes that secured households against the main
causes of poverty. All this was underpinned by a comprehensive
safety net that caught the few who fell through. This insurance
system had its faults but they were being systematically put
right. The state had learned how to prevent long term
unemployment. That was the story in outline. Yet, as the quote
from Professor Harris with which we began shows, this is not a
storyline modern social historians can adopt. Yet, at least until
1948, it seemed a plausible account.
Escaping the Poor Law? 1900–48
The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws which sat in the early
part of the last century reflected, in its famous majority and
minority reports (1909), the clash of ideas about the causes of
poverty we discussed in our opening section – a clash that was
embodied in the formidable personalities of two women
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commissioners, Helen Bosanquet and Beatrice Webb. Both
believed that some of the poor were beyond relief and that
those on relief could not just be left to do as they pleased in
seeking or not seeking work or in the care of children. But the
majority view was that poverty was essentially a moral problem
that lay with the poor and it was exacerbated by the lax and
overgenerous way in which the Poor Law was being
administered. Part of the solution lay in active help and
counselling for those entrapped by it. But that required
tougher action with those who would not respond. We can see
clear parallels with modern debates about welfare reform. The
minority report saw the causes of poverty as largely the result
of basic structural factors in the economy and argued that
provision for the poor should simply become part of a range of
services for the whole community like health, education and
child care. This proved a durable thread in the debate over the
coming century. The minority report became the centrepiece of
a campaign to abolish the Poor Law. 
The elderly
The first group to escape the old Poor Law was the able-bodied
elderly. The reasons lay not just in a concern for their deserving
welfare but in a determination to bear down on the able-
bodied feckless who were seen as a cause of rising poor law
costs. Older people had always been relatively well treated by
poor law authorities but posed a problem if the rising costs of
poor relief were to be contained. The changing industrial
structure of the country, the political economy of poor relief
and the newly politically organised working class all
contributed. In rural areas it was not unusual for men and
women to continue working part-time in less physically
demanding ways well into their sixties and early seventies. Old-
established family firms may have moved workers into less
onerous jobs as they aged (Macnicol, 1998). The more
competitive international environment of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century and the new industry of the time
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meant that employers were less able or prepared to keep men
on much beyond their peak productive period. (We were to see
comparable effects in the 1980s.) Yet life expectancy was
growing. The risks of poverty in old age were growing because
most workers had little opportunity to save significant sums for
themselves and their wives. Local ratepayers were unhappy at
the rising costs. If the central government took on this
responsibility, they would be relieved. Trade unions believed
older workers posed a threat to jobs. They also genuinely
believed that a decent pension was a fair reward for a lifetime
of work. 
Pensions paid out of taxes became a rallying cry of the new
radical Liberals as well as the new Labour movement and social
reformers including Booth. This solution also appealed to those
who wanted to see a more decisive return to the principles of
1834. Detach the more favoured elderly from the Poor Law and
a more rigorous application of the workhouse test would
become easier. The old guard in the Charity Organisation
Society did not see things that way. They saw any extension of
state relief as undermining individual independence. But this
combination of rather unusual allies and the election of a
Liberal government in 1906 produced the first important
‘welfare’ legislation of the twentieth century, though it would
pose increasing long term problems, as we shall see.
The Old Age Pensions Act 1908 was a radical and popular
measure. All those who had been continuously resident in the
UK for 20 years before they were 70 could qualify subject to a
means test. The pension was 5 shillings a week (10s for a
couple) and was reduced if income rose above £21 a year. There
were all kinds of bad behaviour disqualifications, such as
convictions for drunkenness, which were later dropped, and the
residence requirement was shortened. Moreover, 94 per cent of
pensions were for the full amount, showing the limited incomes
or savings people had. This was the first anti-poverty measure
to be financed out of central taxation and marked the
beginning of the trail to the modern welfare state. But it also
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A 1908 cartoon from Punch magazine showing Lloyd George as a highwayman,
collecting funds for the new old age pensions.
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posed dilemmas that are still with us. The pension was means
tested. It was a boon to those who had never had the chance to
save. But what would it do to the saving habits of those in the
next generation? Those who had saved, or been members of a
friendly society or other scheme, lost any benefit as their state
pension was docked pound for pound. Pressure grew to remove
the means test or raise the income limit for the pension, lower
the age at which it could be drawn and make it more generous,
especially as the pension lost value with the inflation of the war
years. The Treasury began to worry that it had let loose a tiger
that would eat up its revenue. 
One way out was favoured by many Liberals, the Treasury
itself and the ‘new’ Conservatives led by Chamberlain. The
strategy was to adopt the route taken for the sick and
unemployed in 1911 – ‘National Insurance’. Calls on the
Exchequer would be limited by making the worker and his
employer responsible for the cost of pensions in the long term.
Pressure for higher pensions would be tempered by the
knowledge that this would result in higher contributions from
existing workers. The costs would not be passed on to the well-
off income tax payer. On the other hand, rights to benefit
would be earned by virtue of the contribution record, not a
means test, which would have advantages for the elderly
person. More than one committee began work on the issue and
the failure of the minority Labour government of 1924 to come
up with any alternative left the new Conservative government
with the opportunity to take the decisive step towards a social
insurance model – the 1925 Widows’, Orphans’ and Old Age
Contributions Act.
A pension would be paid at 65 to all those who had been
contributing to the National Insurance schemes for sickness and
unemployment and to wives and widows of contributors. The
old age pension scheme for those aged 70 would remain but
would no longer be means tested. In 1940 the old age pension
was paid from the age of 60 for women who were insured in
their own right or where the husband had reached 65. The 1908
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scheme had been good for women. Right to benefit was based
on age and residence. Married women received the same sum
as the husband. Under the new scheme women became
covered dependent on the husband’s work record. 
None of these measures removed all old people from poverty
and the Poor Law, however. Many women who were single or
who had been deserted, divorced or separated were on poor
relief, as were those of both sexes who were not covered by a
full contribution record or whose rents brought them below
the means test level. 
Only about 10 per cent of pensioners claimed public
assistance. But in 1940, yielding to growing pressure for
increased pensions across the board, the Treasury responded by
suggesting a much cheaper solution – an increase in the
supplement the poorest pensioners could receive on public
assistance. This was adopted in that year. Old age and widow
Old age pensioners marched from St Paul’s to the House of Commons in November
1938 to demand an increase in pensions from 10 shillings to £1 a week.
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pensioners could receive support from the national agency set
up to provide assistance to the unemployed several years
earlier, renamed the Assistance Board. The Treasury was
convinced that few would be eligible. In fact 1.25 million
applied in the first two months. Freed from the stigma
associated with the local public assistance committees, more old
people were prepared to apply. This and the earlier creation of
the Unemployment Assistance Board, as well as the later
creation of the National Assistance Board, were decisive moves.
Faced with mounting all party pressure to raise pensions for all,
the Treasury was able to persuade the government, as it was to
persuade succeeding ones, that a much cheaper and more
effective strategy lay in relieving the plight of the poorest alone
through a national agency applying a national test of need. It
was to emerge as the winning strategy of the latter half of the
twentieth century.
Widows
Widows were the next most blameless group. They could least of
all be blamed for their poverty. Male age-related mortality rates
were a third higher than female rates at the turn of the century
(Kiernan, Land and Lewis, 1998). Widows’ causes had been
successfully championed in the United States at the end of the
nineteenth century in a political climate very hostile to federal
government action. In a situation where most women were
dependent on a man’s wage and premature male death was
common, widowhood was a major risk and one that commanded
public sympathy. Widows’ pensions were introduced for the
wives of insured workers in the 1925 Act but the test of
respectability remained. ‘Evidence of a new relationship
undermined a widow’s claim to support because it was assumed
the man involved would support her’ (Brooks, 1986).
Sickness
Legitimate absence from work for short term ill health was
again a deserving cause. It was something better off workers
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had clubbed together to support. Simple statistics suggested
larger groups would be less vulnerable, hence the growth of
some large national friendly societies. The fact that workers
were paying for each others’ sickness absence meant there was
a strong incentive to police false claims or overlong absence. It
was this feature that Lloyd George thought would help prevent
abuse of any national scheme. Moreover, politically the friendly
societies were both powerful and useful. They had the spread
of administrative capacity and were organised to do the job of
giving out cash benefits to the sick and paying for treatment by
the general practitioner. They would need to be incorporated
in the administration of any national scheme. So, too, would
the profit-making industrial insurance companies that provided
insurance to cover the costs of burial on a large scale to the
working class and who promised to make things difficult if they
were left out. 
This set a pattern for later social legislation. State provision
was built around and accommodated existing non-
governmental provision, though in the process it often stifled
or restricted it. In many ways the rather complex administration
of a state benefit through very varied not-for-profit and profit-
making organisations worked remarkably well (Whiteside,
1983). It was, however, seen as deeply unfair by those who were
not in employment or insured occupations, and who were
excluded. Small societies and those whose members were
sickest could not provide the range of benefits others could.
The rising level of unemployment put pressure on the finances
of the schemes and was to lead to many losing their rights until
the unemployed gained rights to medical benefit. Whiteside
concludes: ‘In short and simple terms [in a work based insurance
scheme] the best lives, and the highest wage earners, win the
best treatment; the system penalises those not in the labour
market and those dependent on them including the
unemployed’ (1983, p. 191).
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The unemployed
In good times at the turn of the century Rowntree had not
found unemployment to be a major reason for poverty in York.
In the 1920s and especially the 1930s it was to become the
major scourge. The major industries that had been the main
exporters in the nineteenth century struggled after the First
World War and through the 1920s. They were then hit by the
world economic crisis after 1929. This reached into many
people’s lives and affected those who had never had to
undergo the experience of poverty or the indignity of relying
on the local public assistance committee. 
But this experience was not uniform. New industries were
growing in the south. Prices fell, new mass produced consumer
goods began to appear and those in work, especially in these
new industries, did reasonably well. Most people were better
off in 1939 than they had been a decade earlier. 
‘Unemployment’ rates in 1932 varied for the different
regions of the country between 36 per cent in Wales and 13 per
cent in London and the South East. By the mid 1930s the
Homeless men at a soup kitchen in 1924.  Lack of employment was an increasing
cause of poverty during the 1920s and 1930s.
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disparity was even more striking, with unemployment rates in
some towns in the depressed areas revealing tragic stories of
the decay and impoverishment of whole communities; places
such as Brynmawr, Dowlais, Jarrow, Gateshead, Greenock and
Motherwell had almost three-quarters of the insured
population out of work in 1934, while other parts of the
country were experiencing almost boom conditions (Stevenson
and Cook, 1979, p. 5). Special areas received rather late and
inadequate assistance, but this was the beginning of what we
today would call area based policy. 
Economic theory was turned upside down. Unemployment
was clearly not temporary or self correcting. Government came
to see it had a responsibility to affect the total level of demand.
The Budget of 1942 was the first to recognise this responsibility.
The scale of unemployment shook the localised system of
public assistance to the core and transformed it. The means test
The Jarrow Crusade, 1936.  Marching 300 miles from Jarrow in the north-east to
London, the marchers wanted to highlight the poverty and mass unemployment they
and their families were facing.  
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and the local administration of poor relief became the focus of
bitter working class protest. Local areas could not support the
burden out of local taxes. In 1931 the Treasury had to take
responsibility for those who were unemployed long term and
who had lost their insurance rights. A national Unemployment
Assistance Board took over responsibility for this group in 1935
and administered the first nationally funded safety net for the
unemployed, not as a way of being more generous or equitable
but to contain spending. The administration of welfare became
the object of huge organised protests that did succeed in
reversing benefit cuts. The logic of national responsibility
inherent in the Tudor poor law had finally come home to roost. 
Family and child poverty
The central feature of Rowntree’s original diagnosis, the
particular needs of families with children, had not been
addressed despite the analytical and advocacy work of
Rathbone (1917, 1924), many in the suffragette movement and
the conversion of key reformers like Beveridge to family
allowances and Rowntree’s minimum wage proposal. The issue
had been addressed in France and the reasons are interesting.
The British trade unions saw children as a useful bargaining
chip in arguing for a living family wage. French employers saw
the advantages of denying that lever. If employers collectively
redistributed the rewards of labour to reflect the number of
children in the family, pressure to raise the total wage bill might
be mitigated. The pro-family attitude of the Catholic Church
and the pro-natalist stance of government were conducive to
this strategy succeeding. 
In 1932, the state extended these benefits by requiring all
employers in industry to affiliate to one of the private,
business-controlled funds (caisses de compensation) that
had been set up to equalise the costs of such benefits
across firms in particular sectors or regions. Family
allowances were extended to agricultural workers and
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small farmers in the years immediately before the Second
World War. 
(Pedersen, 1993, p. 17)
France thus made far more extensive and explicit provision for
dependent children in the interwar period than did Britain. Yet
it did not do so in the way Eleanor Rathbone would have
hoped. 
Children drinking milk at school in 1938.  Local authorities were
empowered to provide free milk from 1921; in 1946 the School Milk
Act ordered that all pupils under 18 should rececive one-third of a pint
of milk per day.
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If we can characterise British social policy as the
articulation of a male breadwinner logic of welfare,
French policies come to rest on a very different logic,
which I will term ‘parental’ . . . Put simply, while male-
breadwinner policies compensate men for dependent
women and children during legitimate interruptions of
earnings, states with parental policies compensate adults
for dependent children irrespective of earnings or need. 
(Pedersen, 1993, pp. 17–18)
The Beveridge Report and the end of poverty?
So as the Second World War approached the gradual evolution
of a social insurance state was well underway (see table 8).
It was this complex system of multiple and partial social
insurance schemes that Beveridge was appointed to sort out.
But Beveridge interpreted his brief in a much more ambitious
way (Harris, 1997). He saw his role as setting out a programme
of reform – ‘a social plan’ – that would, once and for all, abolish
poverty. In those heady post-war days many thought this had
been, or would shortly be, accomplished.
Beveridge convinced himself, reading Rowntree’s new study
of poverty in York (1941), that a reform of the insurance
schemes we have described and their extension to the whole
population would be enough to abolish ‘want’ so long as they
Table 8: The growth of social insurance (numbers insured in 000s)
Unemployment Health    Old age, widows, 
orphans
1914        2,500 13,689 –
1921       11,081 15,165 –
1926       11,774  16,375 17,089
1931       12,500   17,353 18,513 
1936       14,580 18,081 19,651 
1938       15,395 19,706 20,678
Source: Beveridge (1942), p. 213.
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were accompanied by a series of other key changes that went
far beyond his brief: 
• the ending of long term unemployment through budgetary
policy and demand management;
• the creation of a free National Health Service at the point of
use;
• family allowances set at a level that would cover the basic
costs of the second and subsequent children (for an account
of how and why this came to be accepted for reasons that
had little to do with poverty relief, see Macnicol, 1980);
• for those who slipped through this comprehensive ‘cradle to
grave’ cover, a new National Assistance Board that would
provide a final safety net. 
Beveridge’s notes (found in his own papers) on Rowntree’s
book make his logic clear: ‘the causes of poverty directly
amenable to social insurance accounted for one quarter of
Family Allowance day in London, 1946. The allowance was paid to the mother in
order to make sure the money was spent on the children. When it was introduced,
mothers received 5 shillings a week for each child apart from the eldest.
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primary poverty in 1899 and for five-sixths of the primary
poverty in 1936’ (Evans and Glennerster, 1993). These
contingencies, unemployment, old age, widowhood and large
families, sickness including industrial injuries, could be covered
by a range of insurance benefits covered by a single national
insurance contribution, he argued. It is notable that if
Beveridge had used Rowntree’s more generous measure of the
human needs of labour, low wages would have formed a larger
part of the explanation.
Benefits would be set at a level sufficient to raise all those on
benefit above a ‘minimum needed for subsistence’. Beveridge
suggested taking Rowntree’s primary poverty line as a marker
for this subsistence level. To which Rowntree objected, though
he compromised downwards from his human needs of labour
measure to help Beveridge keep his costs down (Veit-Wilson,
1994). In his report Beveridge gave himself a let-out clause: ‘If
social policy should demand benefits on a higher scale than
subsistence, the whole level of benefit and contribution rates
could be raised without affecting the structure of the scheme’
(1942, para. 27). 
Universal family allowances would ideally be set at the cost of
bringing up a child – they never were, as we shall see. No one
would have to face the costs of medical care or education. Most
people would therefore be taken out of poverty. Only a small
number would have to be caught by the National Assistance
safety net. The logic seemed elegant and it has dominated much
mainstream thinking on the left of politics ever since. But the
utopia was never to be. The benefit levels set were never enough
to raise those wholly dependent on them above the levels set by
the National Assistance scales, in their turn linked to the bottom
of the wage scale, let alone more generous notions. Family
allowances were left to stagnate in real terms and were never set
at a level sufficient to provide for a child’s basic needs. Some have
blamed politicians, the Treasury and powerful economic and
private insurance interests.1 But at root the logic and the political
dynamics of the scheme itself were at fault. 
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For 30 or more years after the national insurance scheme was
founded in its modern post-Beveridge form Labour
governments sought to remedy some of its defects while
Conservative governments resisted, never having accepted the
cost consequences its full logic demanded. Nor, it has to be said,
did Labour governments, in practice.
From Beveridge to the 1970s
Fundamental flaws in the Beveridge model
Some of the flaws were evident at the time. The cost of what
Beveridge wanted to do was simply not acceptable to the
Treasury then or subsequently. In trying to squeeze the package
into an acceptable cash constraint the integrity of the package
fell apart. A few examples illustrate this:
• The assumption was that setting universal flat rate insurance
benefits at Rowntree’s primary poverty level would lift all
those on such benefits out of poverty. This ignored the wide
diversity of rent levels faced by people in different parts of
the country, as Rowntree and others pointed out (Glennerster
and Evans, 1994). Excluding rent from his calculation meant
that most poor people would still be subject to a means test
by the National Assistance Board to meet their rent. Housing
Benefit now covers the rental housing costs of the poor but it
does so at the cost of including a wide range of households in
a means tested poverty trap. Sixty years on we have not
solved the problem that defeated Beveridge. 
• If the model were to work, it had to work for pensioners and
it did not (Macnicol, 1998). Giving a universal flat rate pension
meant spending most money on the non-poor and limited the
generosity possible given the budgetary limits the Treasury
was setting. If the funds were not to come from taxation (as
Beveridge agreed they should not in the long run), the funds
had to come from a flat rate insurance contribution. This
would bear heavily on the poor. Beveridge stuck to the notion
of a flat rate contribution established at the beginning of the
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century as a way of restricting the scope of the potential cost.
The Treasury was determined the scheme should not be a
burden on the general taxpayer. The trade unions argued that
the costs on the low paid should not be excessive. What gave
was the benefit level. Though the pension proposed by
Beveridge was raised by the 1945 Labour government, the
essential problem was never solved by it or by successive
governments. The attempt to introduce benefits related to
previous wages came too late. The political dynamics set up by
the initial low rates of pension proved irreversible (see below).
• The scheme confined married women to the status of
dependents. Single women would be treated as contributors
like men. Marriage was an insurance contract, Beveridge
argued. A woman’s needs were met by her husband. They
should be treated as a unit and she would be insured, as
would her children, as dependents of her husband. Rights to
benefit relied on the husband’s work. Women’s incentives to
work, especially for low pay, were small. Since Beveridge was
so concerned with raising the birth rate this was a virtue for
him, but it was to lay up serious problems for the future. 
• The disabled who were not disabled at work or by war were
not included in his scheme of things. 
Now some of these flaws were capable of remedies. The basis
of the contributions and benefits could become income related,
as was to be the case in other European countries and America.
Women could be treated as insured in their own right. Special
tax based schemes for the disabled could be introduced. Benefit
levels could be made more generous. All these were to become
the stuff of successive attempts to reform the national
insurance system from 1958 to 1975. In the end they too failed. 
Dynamic flaws
The political dynamics set up by the Beveridge plan were to
prove disastrous to any coherent poverty programme in the
next decades. 
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• State benefit levels were constrained by what the poorest
could contribute – deliberately so, many would argue. It was
one of the attractions of the flat rate model to the Treasury.
This meant that skilled workers, let alone the middle class,
never saw the state pension scheme as sufficiently generous
to rely on in old age. They negotiated their own occupational
pension alternatives. This created a powerful set of interests
that opposed going down the road of a generous wage-
related alternative. When the Labour Party began to discuss a
wage related alternative, moving to a copy of the US, Swedish
and German models, in the 1950s, the trade unions were
some of the strongest opponents. Private pension companies
had a powerful voice and no state scheme could be
introduced which threatened them. The basic Beveridge
pension scheme became less important to the median voter
and to the poor. When Mrs Thatcher’s government broke the
link between benefit rates and average earnings in the 1980s
(see chapter 6) it did so largely with political impunity. 
• When the post-war pension scheme was re-examined in the
1950s, and on subsequent occasions, the killer question was:
why should we spend a lot of money raising the basic pension
or other benefits for most people when the poorest are
already catered for by the National Assistance scheme? The
Wilson government of 1964 did significantly raise the level of
the basic pension and other basic benefits. But it came under
political pressure to raise the level of National Assistance too.
Otherwise the poorest, and especially poor elderly people,
would not gain. So a very expensive policy ‘floated off’ very
few people from means tests. 
• The 1974 Labour government again raised the basic pension,
this time by 30 per cent in money terms and 12 per cent in real
terms. It also brought in the State Earnings Related Pension
Scheme. This was the last attempt to make the universal
National Insurance model work. But it came too late. Mrs
Thatcher came to power and both reduced the generosity of
the scheme and encouraged many not to join it, with
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significant tax relief for joining private pension schemes
instead. There was no large body of middle class pensioners
who saw it as in their interests to defend the state scheme, as
there has been in the US.
Poverty disappears and reappears
It took time for the weaknesses of the post-war settlement to
sink in. Compared to the 1930s, the 1940s were indeed an
improvement. Rowntree’s third study of York (Rowntree and
Lavers, 1951) made the case. It was based on a sample survey.
Rowntree had at last convinced himself that this was a
legitimate method! It was brief. The baseline was again a
primary poverty line. The diets of 1936 had been slightly
modified and some changes had been made in the estimates of
a family’s need for clothing, fuel, light and sundries. In 1936,
17.7 per cent of the total population had been below the
poverty line. In 1950 the figure was only 1.6 per cent. Old age
was the main contributory factor at 68 per cent of the total,
and the sick made up 21 per cent. Rowntree and Lavers claimed
that without the welfare measures including food subsidies
introduced after the Second World War, poverty would have
been much higher than it actually was – 25 per cent!
Poverty disappeared from the political radar in the 1950s
until the end of the decade, when work on poverty among the
elderly resurfaced (Cole and Utting, 1962). Later work on
Rowntree’s last results threw some doubt on them. Abel-Smith
and Townsend (1965) used the national sample provided by the
Family Expenditure Survey and updated Rowntree’s poverty
line in line with prices as a check on their own findings for
1953/54 (see below). They found 5.4 per cent of households in
poverty. When Atkinson and colleagues (1981) reanalysed
Rowntree’s data using the then National Assistance Board scales
as the poverty line they found that 14.4 per cent of working
class households would have been judged poor. 
More recently Hatton and Bailey (2000) have reanalysed the
same material to test Rowntree and Lavers’ claim that poverty
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had fallen so dramatically because of the impact of post-war
social policy. They find it did fall but by nothing like as much as
the earlier study claimed. Rowntree and Lavers claimed that the
fall in poverty had been 20 percentage points. Hatton and
Bailey suggest it was about 10 percentage points and much of
that was the result of food subsidies: ‘It is unfortunate that, in
the absence of other comparable studies for the 1950s, this
produced a somewhat distorted picture of poverty in the early
post war period, an impression which took two decades to
counteract’ (2000, p. 537).
Peter Townsend, as a new young researcher at the Institute
for Community Studies, was asked to review Rowntree and
A mother washes her child in a tin bath in the Salford slums, 1955. Poverty had,
however, disappeared from the political radar.
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Lavers and was not convinced. It led him to a lifetime of work
that has changed the way we think about poverty in most
developed economies, with the exception of the United States
(Glennerster, 2002).
His central point was that we cannot determine a level of
adequacy simply by virtue of some expert calculation of dietary
or health needs. Social custom requires that we share cups of
tea with neighbours or buy presents for our children at
Christmas, even have the occasional pint. It is certainly true that
Rowntree recognised this in 1901, as Veit-Wilson (1986) has so
forcefully argued. But, as we have shown, the primary poverty
notion took on its own life and even Rowntree had in practice
abandoned the secondary measure by the time Townsend was
writing. To be income poor, in Townsend’s terms, was to be
excluded, by virtue of one’s income, from the normal activities
of social life. Townsend thought that it should be possible to
construct a list of activities which were the ones that people
should be able to undertake if they were not to suffer what we
might today call social exclusion (Townsend, 1979). This led to
considerable controversy about those activities and whether
there was any clear point at which not to be observed doing
them could be linked to a poverty line (Piachaud, 1981; Desai
and Shah, 1988).
In the interim, however, Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith, his
colleague at the London School of Economics, took a pragmatic
approach to measurement. Each year Parliament itself made a
judgement about what was a minimum acceptable level of
income in the UK when it set the National Assistance rates. Why
not take that National Assistance rate, plus rent which the
Board usually paid, plus some more to cover the extras many
people gained as additions to the basic rate, and use that as an
indication of ‘low levels of living’? To take the crude basic rate
would have ignored the fact that some income was
‘disregarded’ by the Board – small earnings, disability pensions,
war savings and the like. Various percentages above the base
rate were chosen but the favoured one was 40 per cent above.
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They made it clear that this was only a crude first step and that
better ways of measuring relative poverty were needed (Abel-
Smith and Townsend, 1965, pp. 62–3). 
Using an official sample survey of the incomes of families
(designed to be used to construct the Retail Price Index), they
were able to estimate how many people were living below this
poverty line (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965). In 1960 they
found it was nearly 18 per cent of all households (14 per cent of
people). The comparable figure in 1953/54 had been 10 per
cent of households and 7.8 per cent of persons. Numbers of
elderly poor had grown but, as the authors put it, ‘Possibly the
most novel finding is the extent of poverty among children. . . .
This fact has not been given due emphasis in the policies of
political parties’ (1965, p. 65).
There was controversy about the report and criticism
particularly of the comparisons with 1953/54. National
Assistance rates had risen in real terms since 1953, critics said, so
of course the numbers of poor had risen. Relative standards of
living had risen and, just as with Rowntree, the official poverty
line had risen to take that into account, as the authors had
argued in the report itself (1965, pp. 16–20). 
To meet these criticisms later official measures were to use
income relative to a national mean or median income – 40 per
cent, 50 per cent of the mean income or more recently 60 per
cent of the median. 
These technical arguments aside, the wider public, assisted
by the work of the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG),
absorbed and accepted the basic argument. The result was to
put poverty back on the political map. Social science had ‘lifted
the curtain’ once again so that the comfortable majority had to
confront the reality of life at the bottom.
Child poverty became a political issue again. Family
allowances had been held constant in cash terms since the early
1950s. They were gradually wasting away in real terms and
relative to earnings. They were increased in 1968 as a result of
the political pressure CPAG was able to exert across the political
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spectrum. The standard rate taxpayer had the extra cash fully
taxed away. The Conservative government that followed
introduced the Family Income Support (FIS) scheme as one of its
first measures in 1970 – the alternative the Treasury had
favoured all along. It was a separate tax-funded benefit that
low income families had to apply to get through local social
security offices. Many did not – initially about 30 per cent -
though take-up gradually rose to over 80 per cent in the 1980s.
Numbers on the benefit, and its successor, the Family Credit,
rose from about 100,000 in 1973 to over half a million by the
mid 1990s, mostly because family poverty grew. 
The Labour government that followed kept FIS but
introduced an extended version of the old Family Allowance
called Child Benefit, which we still have. It was both more
generous and went to the first child as well. It was paid for in
large part by removing the tax advantages previously derived
by taxpaying families and especially those paying tax at high
levels from child tax allowances. 
The same government tried to remedy the deficiencies of the
flat rate state pension by introducing a wage related scheme on
top, the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). This
has since, indeed, topped up the pensions of many pensioners
to raise them above the poverty line. But those in occupational
schemes were always able to opt out. It never had time to
become embedded in the political landscape and attract the
powerful support enjoyed by the American, Swedish or German
pension arrangements. 
The other significant development of the 1970s was the
recognition of the particular needs of those with disabilities
and resulted from well organised groups and well articulated
needs. Beveridge had largely ignored them except for those
disabled at work or fighting in a war. The Attendance
Allowance was introduced in 1972. A Mobility Allowance for
those who found difficulty in getting about and who needed
more costly forms of transport, an Invalid Care Allowance for
those looking after those needing special attention, and other
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non-contributory benefits were introduced in 1976. They took
some account of the extra costs disability caused. A given level
of income might be above the poverty line for a fully mobile
person but not for someone who needed more income to be
equivalently mobile. This was an extension of the meaning and
concept of poverty, as well as being important to those
receiving the benefits. Numbers receiving Attendance
Allowance rose from 145,000 to over 900,000 between 1973
and 1991. Numbers on Invalidity Benefit and Severe
Disablement Allowance rose from 104,000 to 326,000 between
1973 and 1994. Numbers receiving Mobility Allowance rose
from 62,000 in 1977 to nearly 700,000 in 1991 (Evans, 1998).
Women’s poverty rediscovered
Another important feature of social science research begun in
the 1970s and 1980s was the re-emergence of a feminist
perspective on poverty. Poverty had its most profound impact on
women and yet this was not seen or appreciated – ‘Invisible
Women, Invisible Poverty’ as Jane Millar and Caroline
Glendinning (1987) put it. Some of the insights were not new, as
we saw earlier, but they were deepened and extended. New
work was done on the distribution of income within the family
and the importance of getting income to the mother (Pahl
1989). That was, in the end, to bear some fruit in the changes
that were made to the tax credit schemes in the New Labour
period. The work on the financial and other needs of carers
which began in this period was mostly done by women (Parker,
1985; Glendinning, 1992). So, too, was the thorough and non-
judgemental work on the change in families and single
parenthood (Kiernan, Land and Lewis, 1998). Policy makers no
longer have the excuse that these poverty situations are hidden. 
Gathering clouds
The anti-poverty measures up to the mid 1970s do therefore
have some kind of logical sequence. The needs of new poverty
groups came to be articulated and pressed home. The scale and
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breadth of the safety net was gradually widened, even if its
generosity was not. Social insurance remained the preferred
social policy method for poverty avoidance, even if individuals
in the top income groups had come increasingly to rely on
occupation based forms of insurance against old age and short
term sickness. It was the late 1970s and 1980s that brought the
significant change both in the scale of the poverty problem and
in the nature of the social policy response (Glennerster, 2000;
Lowe, 1999). 
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It is tempting to try to divide periods of social policy and the
evolution of their outcomes by neat political divisions – the
election of the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher
in 1979, or of the ‘New Labour’ government of Tony Blair in
1997 being two of the most obvious discontinuities. However,
events and policies do not necessarily change with such abrupt
boundaries.
6 The last quarter century
From New Right to New Labour
John Hills
When the Thatcher Government came to power in 1979, income inequality and
poverty were near to an all-time low.  Two major policy directions of the new
government were to restrain and reduce public spending – of which social security
was a major part – and improve incentives to work.
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For instance, one of the defining features of the Thatcher
government was its aim of reducing public spending, particularly
that on the ‘welfare state’. But the post-war growth of social
spending as a share of national income ended not in 1979, but in
1976, after the Labour cabinet minister Tony Crosland had
announced that ‘the party is over’ and after the visit of the
International Monetary Fund. And public spending restraint
continued after May 1997, with New Labour fulfilling its election
pledge to stick to Conservative spending plans for two years. By
1999/00, overall public spending (Total Managed Expenditure)
had fallen to 37.4 per cent of GDP, fully two percentage points of
national income below the lowest level achieved under the
Conservatives (in 1988/89), and four points below the minimum
under the Heath government of the early 1970s.
Similarly, perhaps the most important change in policy
towards social security and poverty introduced by the Thatcher
government was its decision in 1981 to adjust (‘uprate’) the
value of social security benefits each year only in line with price
inflation. For some key benefits, such as the basic state
retirement pension, this broke with the previous policy of
adjusting values in line with earnings growth. This makes it
easier for the public finances to cope with benefit spending (as
tax revenues tend to rise at least in line with incomes) but
leaves those dependent on benefits further and further behind
general living standards, and deeper in poverty (if a relative
poverty line is used, as discussed in chapter 3 above). But New
Labour has not reversed this decision as a default for most
benefits. Instead, since 1999 it has been making selective
increases in some benefits but not others, and devoting
resources to reforms such as the new ‘tax credits’. Many people
have done better than they would have done under a policy of
returning to earnings indexation without reform, but others
have not and continue to live on incomes that are falling in
relative terms.
In terms of outcomes, we have already seen in chapter 3
(figures 5 and 6) that relative poverty for the population as a
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whole reached a low point in the late 1970s. So did measures of
the inequality of the income distribution. But depending on the
exact measure chosen, the low point can be seen to be any of
the years 1977, 1978 or 1979. The turning point in what some
had come to see as Britain’s steady progress towards becoming
a more equal society did not necessarily coincide with the
change of government, even if some of the Conservative
government’s policies would greatly accelerate that change.
This chapter therefore tries to take an overview of the last 25
years, looking across some of the themes which have been
discussed in earlier chapters: overall policy towards poverty;
public spending; the structure of social security; families and
children; unemployment and incentives; and old age. It then
looks at the outcomes of these policies and of other pressures
on poverty rates.
Policy towards poverty
Poverty, inequality, and policies to reduce them, were not high
on the Thatcher government’s agenda. The Royal Commission
on the Distribution of Income and Wealth established by
Labour was wound up. The government tried hard (if
unsuccessfully) to bury the report commissioned by Labour
from Sir Douglas Black’s committee on health inequalities and
their links to poverty when it appeared in 1980. An
interdepartmental Group on Poverty Study was tellingly
renamed as the working group on Work Incentives and Income
Compression (of which the author became a member), and its
priorities for policy reform changed accordingly. Famously, in
1989 the then Social Security Secretary, John Moore, announced
‘the end of the line for poverty’, arguing that it was ‘false and
dangerous’ to talk as if large parts of the British population
were in dire need on the basis of poverty lines that rose with
national prosperity (Timmins, 1995, pp. 450–1).
In one sense, the change in political priorities is
understandable. Income inequality and poverty (whether
measured in relative or absolute terms) were near to their all-
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time lows in 1979. Equally, economic growth and growth of
average living standards had also been at post-war lows since
the oil shocks of the early 1970s. The diagnosis of the incoming
government was that the two were connected – via the
disincentive effects of overgenerous social security benefits on
the one hand, and by the effects on economic and productivity
growth of an overlarge public sector on the other. Its policies
were therefore aimed at restraining and reducing public
spending – of which social security was a major part – and at
changing the system to improve incentives to work. If
challenged on the impact of such policies on the poor, the
response echoed that of the parallel Reagan administration in
the US in the 1980s – that the benefits of faster growth in living
standards for those with high incomes allowed by lower taxes
would ‘trickle down’ to those at the bottom.
There was little evidence of this happening in the 1980s.
Instead, poverty and the response to it became dominated by
four upward pressures. First, Britain went into deep economic
recession in the early 1980s, followed by a brief boom in the
second half of the decade, and then a renewed leap in
unemployment at its end. Much of the subsequent evolution of
social security can be seen as a response to this and its impact
on public spending. Second, at the same time as the rise in
unemployment and economic inactivity, the position of
unskilled workers was weakening more generally in the labour
market – the real value of the level of wages below which the
bottom tenth of male earners fell was no higher in the early
1990s than it had been in the mid 1970s (Barclay, 1995, fig. 6).
Third, society was changing. While 12 per cent of children were
living in lone parent families in 1979, 20 per cent of children
were by 1997. Such families were much more likely to be
without an income from work and in poverty than others, and
the ‘breadwinner’ based social insurance system bequeathed by
Beveridge did little to help. Fourth, the country was ageing and
the number of pensioners growing. While this was not in itself
at such a dramatic rate, the cost of state pensions was set to
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grow rapidly as Barbara Castle’s State Earnings Related Pension
Scheme matured. Under its rules, full rights could accrue in 20
years, so someone with average earnings retiring in 1998 could
receive an extra earnings-related pension from the state almost
equalling in value what the basic pension had been in 1978.
Although the rules were made less generous (for those retiring
later) in 1988, proposals to abolish SERPS outright were
rejected, and its cost grew.
All this left a contradiction in policy which has yet to be
resolved. Attempting to restrain public spending growth in the
face of such pressures, while avoiding outright cuts in benefits
for the poorest, pushed governments particularly in the 1980s
towards more reliance on the social safety net of what was
Supplementary Benefit (and became Income Support) and on
other forms of means testing. But this reliance increases the
number of people affected by the disincentive effects of
withdrawal of means tested benefit, contradicting the other
overarching aim of policy of improving incentives.
Under John Major’s government of the 1990s, policy became
Minimum wage protesters in Brighton in 1995. Wages for the lowest paid were no higher
in real terms in the early 1990s than they had been in the early 1970s.
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less harsh. The regressive Poll Tax, used to finance local
government through a flat rate charge on all adults, was
abolished and replaced with the property related Council Tax.
Crucially for the poorest, the right to an income related rebate
of up to 100 per cent of the new tax’s value was restored,
whereas in theory everyone had been liable to pay at least 20
per cent of the Poll Tax, no matter how low their income. When
tax rises came after the 1992 election, they bore more heavily
on those with higher incomes. For a period in the mid 1990s,
while average living standards rose only slowly, relative poverty
fell slightly, and the growth in overall inequality halted.
Labour’s election campaign in 1997 said and promised little
about poverty. The manifesto contained just two references to
poverty, one in the context of tax and benefit reform to reduce
welfare dependency, and the other about helping people into
jobs. It did promise to tackle educational disadvantage, to
introduce a minimum wage, and to reduce long term
unemployment, particularly among young people. One of the
five ‘early pledges’ around which Labour built its campaign was
to cut youth unemployment, using resources from a ‘windfall
tax’ on the privatised utilities.
In office the first move was indeed the introduction of the
‘New Deal’ programmes designed to get people off benefits
and into work. Shortly after the election the government
announced a new Social Exclusion Unit , reporting directly to
the Prime Minister, and focusing on problems of compounded
disadvantage, particularly those that cut across Whitehall
departments. At one point, Tony Blair described the unit as ‘the
defining difference’ between New Labour and the
Conservatives. However, in the autumn of 1997, New Labour
found itself embroiled in a row around the abolition of special
additional benefits for lone parents. This had been built into
the Conservative spending plans to which Labour had
committed itself, and the government pushed it through
despite significant opposition from its own Members of
Parliament. By the time of the March 1998 Budget it became
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clear that benefits and new tax credits were to be improved for
all low income families in a way that meant few lone parents
would actually lose out (indeed, they have been the largest
gainers from New Labour’s reforms). But by then many people’s
views of New Labour’s priorities had been set and they would
be slow to change.
In terms of policy presentation, the decisive moment came in
March 1999, when Tony Blair used a lecture in memory of
William Beveridge to announce: ‘Our historic aim will be for
ours to be the first generation to end child poverty. It is a 20-
year mission, but I believe it can be done’ (Blair, 1999). This was
followed up by a specific target to cut child poverty in relative
terms (against a benchmark of 60 per cent of current median
income) by a quarter between 1998/99 and 2004/05. In 2004
In his Beveridge Lecture in 1999 Tony Blair pledged to eradicate child poverty within 
a generation. 
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that target was further extended to achieve a cut of a half by
2010/11, with the 20-year target now defined as being
‘amongst the best in Europe’ in terms of relative poverty – still
very ambitious given Britain’s starting point as the worst in
Europe in the mid 1990s, with rates three to four times those in
some Scandinavian countries.
In September 1999 the government also published its first
annual report of progress on poverty and social exclusion,
Opportunity for All. This outlined what the government saw as
the key features driving poverty and exclusion: lack of
opportunities to work or acquire education and skills;
childhood deprivation; disrupted families; barriers to older
people living active, fulfilling and healthy lives; inequalities in
health; poor housing; poor neighbourhoods; fear of crime; and
discrimination (DSS, 1999, p. 2).
Policy has followed along most of those dimensions, some of
which are discussed in more detail below.1 Promoting work and
‘making work pay’ has been prominent, involving not just the
New Deals and the macroeconomic policies aimed to promote
economic stability, but also the introduction of Britain’s first
National Minimum Wage, and the transformation of social
security benefits into more generous tax credits. But at the same
time, and in contrast to policies in the US, allowances for the
children of those who are out of work have also been increased
well above inflation. After dropping to a low point in 1999,
public spending on education is rising, with particular emphasis
on poorly performing schools. Policy towards pensioners has
been selective, focused on increasing the value of the means
tested minimum (now known as the ‘guarantee credit’ of the
Pension Credit). The universal basic pension has remained linked
to prices in most years, although all pensioners have benefited
from various other measures, such as an annual ‘winter fuel
allowance’. At the 2002 Labour Party Conference Gordon Brown
pledged that ‘Our aim is to end pensioner poverty in our
country’, although unlike the child poverty commitment there is
no timescale or specific benchmark for this.
The last quarter century































































































































































An accumulation of evidence had shown the ways in which
the country had become more polarised between different
kinds of area, not just as the old industrial regions declined, but
also within towns and cities across the country (Hills, 1995). The
biggest part of the Social Exclusion Unit’s work led to the
establishment of a National Strategy for Neighbourhood
Renewal and to New Labour’s most ambitious target, that
‘within 10–20 years, no one should be seriously disadvantaged
by where they live’. A set of ‘floor targets’ has been set for
achievement in employment, education, crime, health and
housing in the most disadvantaged areas. Some of the related
policies have been for ‘mainstream services’, such as health,
education and policing, but others have been targeted on
particular areas, such as the New Deal for Communities,
neighbourhood wardens, the Sure Start early years
programmes, and Excellence in Cities for education.2
Unlike the US in the early 1960s, there has been no
declaration of ‘War on Poverty’, and nor is there any
overarching target to reduce poverty overall, as there is in
Ireland. But none the less, by the start of the twenty-first
century there was a commitment to tackle poverty and
disadvantage that had not been seen since the 1960s, if not the
1940s, and a raft of specific policy initiatives aimed at particular
aspects of the problem. The issue for the future is whether the
scope of these is enough, and what could be done to fill the
gaps in them (see chapter 7).
Public spending
Although governments can affect income distribution and
poverty in other ways, the largest effects come from the
combination of public spending and the taxes that pay for it.
This is not just a matter of spending on social security benefits,
but also that on other elements of what is sometimes called the
‘social wage’ – health care, education, housing, and personal
social services (Sefton, 2002).
As figure 8 shows, the total of the three largest elements of
The last quarter century






































































































































social spending, health, education and social security, had
reached 10 per cent of national income in the 1930s. Its main
period of growth came in the 30 years after the end of the
Second World War, taking the total to 20 per cent of national
income by 1976/77.
Since then social spending more widely defined has
fluctuated around a quarter of national income – indeed,
equalling this in both 1979/80, the Thatcher government’s first
year in office, and in 2002/03, New Labour’s sixth year (figure 9).
A large part of the variation in the last quarter century has
related to the state of the economy, with social security
spending rising in the recessions of the early 1980s and early
1990s, and falling again in the subsequent recoveries. More
recently, policy changes have had a clearer effect – the post-
1997 election austerity leading to the low point of social
spending in 1999/00, and subsequent policies that have
increased spending, notably taking the total of health and
education spending to their highest share of GDP ever by the
end of the period shown. In contrast, housing spending has
become a much smaller share of the total over the 25 years, and
social security (even including the new tax credits) is a smaller
share of GDP than ten years ago.
The comparatively static total results from the collision of
two opposing forces: the desire to reduce public spending to
allow lower taxes, particularly in the 1980s; and the upward
pressures on pensions, social services and health care from an
ageing population, on social security from higher levels of
market inequality, and on almost all of these items from
growing affluence. As we get richer, many of the items social
spending covers – notably health care and education – are ones
to which we want to devote an increasing proportion of
income. As we discuss in the next chapter, these pressures are
unlikely to get any easier. Over much of the last 25 years,
policies ‘put the lid’ on social spending, but did so at a cost of
growing means testing, falling relative incomes for the poorest,
and tight constriction of public services in relation to public
The last quarter century

















































































































































































demands for them. More recently some growth in social
spending has been accommodated without a large increase in
taxes as a share of GDP through squeezing down other parts of
public spending (notably defence and debt interest). However,
the room to do this is narrowing, leaving policy makers with
some increasingly uncomfortable choices (Hills, 2004a, ch. 11).
The structure of social security
As the previous chapter described, the reforms of the Attlee
government in the 1940s, following the Beveridge Report,
attempted to make the National Insurance system the major
part of social security, with minimal reliance on means tested
benefits. As discussed, this did not happen, partly because new
risks emerged which were not covered well by the
‘breadwinner’ based Beveridge model (Baldwin and
Falkingham, 1994), but also because contributory social
insurance benefits were never set at a high enough level to get
recipients clear of the acceptable minimum, particularly after
allowing for housing costs. None the less, led by spending on
the basic pension, contributory benefits did dominate the social
security budget for more than 30 years, representing three-
quarters of all benefits in 1973/74, and reaching a peak of 6.5
per cent of national income ten years later (figure 10).
But for 30 years now, despite the introduction of the
contribution based State Earnings Related Pension Scheme in
1978, the role of insurance benefits within the system has been
in retreat. The large increases in social security spending in the
early 1980s and early 1990s took the form of means tested
benefits. At the same time, the role of non-means tested, but
also non-contributory, benefits (such as Child Benefit or some
disability benefits) has also increased. Two pressures have rolled
back the role of National Insurance. First, under Conservative
governments in the early 1970s and the 1980s, the emphasis
was on trying to ‘target’ a constrained budget most efficiently,
with means testing seen as the way to do this. As far as pensions
are concerned, this process has continued since 1997.
The last quarter century
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Conditions for receiving insurance benefits were also
tightened, and their generosity reduced, particularly with the
removal of earnings related additions to unemployment and
sickness benefits in the 1980s.
At other times, however, it has been the restrictive nature of
contribution conditions – particularly for those with a limited
work record – that has led governments with more inclusive
aims to increase the emphasis on non-contributory benefits.
Together, these pressures from both left and right have led to
the steady decline of the contributory system. The roots of this
were discussed in chapter 5: an important factor was that,
unlike many other European countries, the UK had a
comprehensive – and fairly effective – means tested minimum
to fall back on as social insurance came under pressure. The very
strength of the safety net made the rundown of social
insurance possible both politically and administratively in a way
that it would not have been elsewhere.
More recently, since 1998 some of what were social security
benefits – the old Family Credit (originally Family Income
Supplement) and Income Support allowances for children –
have been transformed into ‘tax credits’. The distributional
effects of this are discussed below, but one aim of the exercise
has been to destigmatise payments, making them part of the
tax machinery and associating them with the government’s
‘making work pay’ rhetoric. Whether this has improved take-up
– a besetting problem with means tested benefits – is still
unclear, but it has certainly allowed extra resources to go in this
direction (some of them outside what would otherwise have
been called ‘public spending’) in way that might otherwise have
been politically more difficult.
The other crucial change of the last quarter century has been
the change in the values of benefits, both relative to each
other, and relative to other incomes. Different parts of the
benefit system have been treated in different ways. Figure 11
shows what has happened since 1971 to the values of four
example benefits: the single basic state retirement pension;
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Income Support (or its equivalent) for single pensioners;
unemployment benefit (now Jobseeker’s Allowance or JSA) for
single people; and Income Support for single people aged 25 to
60. The first panel shows their values in real terms, the second
one values relative to average adult earnings.3 The basic
pension increased significantly in real terms between 1971 and
1983, after which the early 1980s policy decision of the
Thatcher government to link most benefit levels to prices rather
than to earnings or other incomes took effect, and its real value
stayed much the same until the end of the 1990s. In some
recent years its real value has increased under New Labour
following a commitment to a minimum cash increase each year
(reacting to the political furore when low inflation led to a cash
increase of only 75p per week one year). The basic policy
remains one of protecting only its real value, however. As a
result, the second panel shows that its relative value fell from
26 per cent of average earnings in 1983 to 18 per cent by 1990,
and 16 per cent by 2002. By contrast, the real value of Income
Support for pensioners has increased steadily since 1976,
including through the 1980s, but with particularly large
increases since 1998. As a result, the value of the means tested
minimum for a single pensioner was almost as great in relation
to average earnings in 2002 as it had been in 1971.
The decline in the relative value of unemployment benefit
since its link with the pension was broken in 1973 has been
even greater, particularly since the early 1980s, falling from 21
per cent of average earnings in 1979 to 12 per cent by 2002. In
this case the values of non-means tested and means tested
benefits had converged by the end of the period. As the figure
shows, social security benefits for working age people without
children have continued to fall in relative value since 1997.
Families and children
One of the main social security reforms of the late 1970s had
been the amalgamation of the old family allowances with
income tax child allowances. The former, also stemming from
The last quarter century
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the 1940s, had not been paid for the first child. The latter had
delivered nothing to non-taxpayers, the poorest, and most to
those paying the highest rates of income tax. By contrast, the
new Child Benefit was paid equally in respect of all children.
This has great advantages in achieving almost complete take-
up, and in avoiding the disincentives associated with means
tested alternatives. Its proponents – notably the Child Poverty
Action Group under its then director, Frank Field – had pointed
in the 1970s to its universal nature as a source of political
strength: the ‘sharp elbows of the middle classes’ would resist
attempts to cut it back, and so protect poor families at the same
time. This very feature, however, made Child Benefit the focus
of attention when the government was trying to cut back
public spending in the 1980s – why should scarce public
resources go to the middle classes, even, as was often pointed
out, to the Duchess of Westminster, wife of the richest man in
the country?
The end result of such pressure was a three year period when
the cash value of Child Benefit was frozen in the late 1980s,
while under the ‘Fowler reforms’ of 1988 the means tested
benefit for families with children and low earnings was
renamed Family Credit and made more generous. The ‘sharp
elbows’ had their effect under the Major government, however,
and Child Benefit was unfrozen and increased for the first child.
An innovation of the early 1990s was the introduction of the
Child Support Agency from 1993 in response to the growing
numbers of lone parents, high poverty levels among lone
parent families, and the extent to which such families were
reliant on social security benefits, particularly Income Support.
The aim of the CSA is to try to improve the very low levels of
maintenance paid by ‘absent parents’ (usually fathers) to
‘parents with care’ (usually mothers). In trying to do this it faces
difficulties both in assessing how much absent parents (often
part of a new family with children) can afford to pay, and in
enforcing payment. The second difficulty is compounded when
the parent with care is receiving Income Support and little or no
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benefit from child support payments ends up with them,
resulting instead in a saving to government in the Income
Support which has to be paid.
It is in the tax and benefit treatment of families with
children that New Labour has made its largest changes, as the
figures for the values of benefits and tax credits in table 9
show. Child Benefit paid for the first child had increased by 14
per cent in real terms between 1991 and 1997, but Income
Support levels for families had changed little in real terms. Nor
had there been much rise in the real incomes (after housing
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Table 9: Increases in Child Benefit, Income Support and net income after
housing costs, April 1991 to April 2003 (£ per week, April 2003 prices)
April April April Change Change 
1991 1997 2003 1991– 1997–
1997 (%) 2003 (%)
Child Benefit (first child) 11.23 12.81 16.05 14.1 25.3
Child Benefit (subsequent 
children) 9.87 10.43 10.75 5.7 3.1
Income Support (lone 
parent, 1 child under 11) 87.70 91.18 108.90 4.0 19.4
Income Support (couple, 
1 child under 11) 112.03 116.87 140.00 4.3 19.8
Income Support (couple, 
2 children under 11) 129.93 135.71 178.50 4.4 31.5
Net income after housing costs
Couple, 2 children, on 
average earnings 297.18 311.73 352.00 4.9 12.9
Lone parent, 1 child, on 
average earnings 217.64 229.33 266.22 5.4 16.1
Couple, 2 children, on half 
average earnings 165.13 177.61 239.90 7.6 35.1
Lone parent, 1 child, on 
half average earnings 146.01 156.95 193.55 7.5 23.3
Source: Stewart (2005a), based on DWP (2004).
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costs) of families with children on average or below average
earnings, allowing for the tax system and benefits they could
have received. Over the following six years, the picture was
very different. Child Benefit for the first child increased by a
quarter in real terms,4 and Income Support for families with
young children rose by at least a fifth (more for larger
families). The real value of the child element for a child aged
under 11 (£27.75 per week) of the new Child Tax Credit when
it was introduced in April 2003 was twice as high as its
equivalent under the old Family Credit system had been in
1997 (Hills, 2004a, table 9.1). As a result of this and other tax
and tax credit changes, a couple with two children and wages
of half average earnings were a third better off in real terms
in 2003 than they had been in 1997.
This has been a major commitment by the government.
Between 1997/98 and 2002/03, spending on child-contingent
benefits rose from 1.38 to 2.04 per cent of GDP. Spending on
early years policies and child care grew from 0.21 to 0.33 per
cent of GDP (Stewart, 2005a, table 7.9). Even before the
reforms associated with Child Tax Credit in April 2003, the
additional commitment to cash and services for children
represented 0.8 per cent of GDP. By 2004, the additional
spending had reached 1 per cent of national income.
The unemployed and incentives to work
Although benefits for those classed as unemployed make up
only a very small part of the social security budget (5 per cent
in 2001/02), their structure and the disincentives they may
create have continued to be a major focus of attention in the
last quarter century. This is not least because they are generally
believed to be such a large part of the budget: 44 per cent of
respondents to the 2001 British Social Attitudes survey thought
that they were the largest item in social security spending, and
a further 27 per cent thought them the next largest part
(Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2002). Large proportions of the
population believe that the benefits make unemployed people
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less likely to look for work and that the system is widely abused
through fraud (Hills, 2004a, figs 6.11 and 6.13).
This was certainly the belief of the Thatcher government
when it came into power, leading it to set in place a series of
measures that reduced benefit entitlements, particularly to
national insurance based Unemployment Benefit (now known
as insurance based Jobseeker’s Allowance). The aim was to
reduce ‘replacement rates’, the ratio between incomes out of
work and those in work. As well as adjusting the values of
benefits in line only with prices each year (with the effects on
values relative to earnings shown in figure 11 above), additions
related to previous earnings were abolished, conditions related
to previous contributions made tighter, and the lengths of
entitlement to non-means tested benefits were cut. In all,
Atkinson and Micklewright (1989) recorded 38 changes to the
system of benefits for the unemployed in the 1980s, nearly all
of them reducing entitlements.
Despite this, the numbers unemployed remained high. One
effect of the changes was to increase the numbers receiving
means tested Income Support. At the same time, tacit
encouragement was given by the government for people to be
recorded as out of work due to invalidity (now ‘incapacity’)
rather than to be looking for work. As old heavy industries were
‘shaken out’, the number of people – particularly older men –
who were of working age but economically inactive grew
rapidly, particularly in the old industrial parts of the country.
Economic inactivity for working age men grew from 12 per cent
in the late 1980s to 15 per cent by 1997, and continued to grow
slowly, reaching 16 per cent by 2003 (McKnight, 2005, fig. 2.3).
Over time, however, the emphasis on ‘active labour market
measures’ – assistance and encouragement with job search and
training – rather than on reducing incomes out of work
gradually increased. This eventually led to the introduction of
Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996. Entitlement to non-means
tested benefit was again cut, this time to six months, but the
emphasis on support for job-search and training was increased.
The last quarter century
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In many ways, New Labour’s ‘New Deal’ programmes can be
seen as a continuation of the direction already taken by the
Major government’s JSA reforms – but with considerably more
resources put into positive supports, particularly for the young
unemployed.
Evaluations of most of these active labour market – or
‘welfare to work’ – programmes consistently show positive but
small effects (McKnight, 2005). For instance, a recent evaluation
of New Labour’s flagship New Deal for Young People suggests
that it has been a success, and represents good value for money
– but that there are only 17,000 extra young people in work as
a result of it than there would otherwise have been (Van
Reenan, 2004). Such effects are useful, and almost certainly
crucial in winning public backing for overall support for
unemployed people, but by themselves hardly transform the
picture.
At the same time, the incentive effects of all of these reforms
have been ambiguous. In the Conservative period, incomes for
those out of work were reduced by comparison with incomes in
work. However, the effects of this were sometimes blunted –
both by the increasing incidence of low pay and by factors such
as Housing Benefit. As housing subsidies were reduced, and
rents rose, the availability of benefit covering 100 per cent of
rent for those with the lowest incomes became a larger part of
the equation. Faced with rapidly rising costs of Housing Benefit,
but still trying to preserve the integrity of the national
minimum, assistance for those just above the minimum was cut
back. The ‘tapers’ in both Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit became steeper, leaving little gain from extra earnings
for those affected by them.
This contributed to further deepening the ‘poverty trap’, the
phenomenon first identified in the 1960s that the combination
of taxes on additional income and withdrawal of means tested
benefits could mean that poor families would need very large
increases in gross earnings for there to be any noticeable effect
on raising their net income. Figure 12 shows the end result of
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the Conservative reforms, giving the position in 1997/98
(adjusted to 2003/04 prices) of a one earner couple with two
children, who were also tenants. As can be seen, over a
considerable range of gross income, net income would hardly
have risen at all even if earnings rose substantially. With gross
earnings of £75 per week, their net income would have been
£227. With gross earnings of £275, net income would only have
risen to £248: a £200 increase in earnings would have left them
only £21 better off (before allowing for any resultant increased
costs of working such as transport or child care). As a result,
even with earnings of £275 per week, the difference between
net income in work and that out of work (on Income Support
of £211 at 2003/04 prices, including help with housing costs)
remained small.
New Labour’s reforms, culminating in the introduction of the
Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit in April 2003, have
changed the position in three ways. First, incomes out of work
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and on Income Support have been increased. At the very lowest
levels of earnings, the gain from working remains low. But
figure 12 shows that for those with somewhat higher earnings
the system has been made much more generous – there is both
a larger gain from earning more, and for earnings above about
£250 per week there is a much larger margin over income out
of work. However, the third effect is that the way in which
higher earnings lead to reduced tax credits now extends over a
much wider income range – in this case up to earnings of £420
per week. The poverty trap has been made shallower but wider.
Figure 13 shows this effect in another way. In this case it
shows the ‘effective marginal tax rates’ facing the families in
figure 12 in the 1997/98 and 2003/04 systems: what percentage
of any increase in gross income would be lost through income
tax, National Insurance contributions, benefit and tax credit
withdrawal. In the 1997/98 system, rates were near to 100 per
cent right up to earnings of £275 per week. In the 2003/04
system, this range is much shorter, ending at £200 per week. But
the cost of this is that the family faces a 70 per cent effective
marginal tax rate over a much wider range.5
The Treasury calculates that under the 1997/98 system
740,000 working families faced effective marginal tax rates
above 70 per cent, and that only 270,000 do so in the 2004/05
system (HM Treasury, 2003b, table 4.2). However, 1.8 million
now face rates ‘above 60 per cent’ (mostly actually facing 70 per
cent exactly), compared with only 760,000 before. Acute
disincentives affecting a smaller number have been replaced
with less acute ones facing many more. So far the evidence is
that on balance the reforms – despite their greater generosity
to families who have children and who are out of work or on
low wages – have had a net positive effect on labour supply
(Brewer et al., 2003). A problem facing future policy is,
however, that any extension of generosity of the tax credit
system to help further reduce poverty also means extending the
problem to higher income ranges (or increasing tax credit
withdrawal rates, so deepening the poverty trap again). The
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effect can be compounded by other means tests – for instance
within student support or Education Maintenance Allowances
for young people staying on in education after 16.
Pensions
The main changes to pensions policy in the last 25 years have
already been touched on above. Perhaps strangely, the overall
effect has been that policy has gone full circle. In a very
convoluted way, current plans for future pensions are designed
to return state support for pensioners to something not so
distant from Beveridge’s model of equal support for all (Hills,
2004b).
The first reform was set in motion in the 1970s – Barbara
Castle’s State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) started
in 1978. The principle of this was that as well as entitlement to
The last quarter century
Figure 13:  Effective marginal tax rates under 1997/98 and 2003/04

























Note: In the 1997/98 system, the effect of Family Credit withdrawal could be delayed up to
six months; in the 2003/04 system, the effect of tax credit withdrawal could be delayed until
the next tax year (for increases in annual income above original assessment of up to £2500).
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Source: Hills (2004a), Fig. 10.7.
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the flat rate basic state pension (worth nearly a quarter of
average earnings in 1978), people would also build up rights
which related to the earnings on which they paid National
Insurance contributions – worth a quarter of their own average
lifetime earnings (in excess of each year’s lower limit). This
would get those with reasonable earnings well clear of the
poverty line in retirement, even if they were not members of a
private pension scheme.
However, the incoming Conservative government was not
prepared to accept the additional cost of state pensions as a
share of GDP that this would imply if the relative value of the
basic pension was also to be maintained. In effect, the decision
to cut the link between the value of the basic pension and
earnings growth (with the effects shown in figure 11) created
the fiscal headroom to pay for the growing costs of SERPS over
the 1980s and 1990s. Instead of Barbara Castle’s vision of the
new system leading to gains for all pensioners, the end result
has been lower pensions for those with low lifetime earnings,
and higher ones for those who were better off at work.
For the future, the Fowler reforms of 1988 cut back the rate
at which SERPS rights would accrue, and policy continued
through the 1990s and past 1997 on the assumption that the
value of the basic pension would continue to fall in relative
terms – until it eventually became ‘nugatory’, in Michael
Portillo’s famous description of it in 1993.
New Labour has not reversed this, but instead has changed
the system in three ways designed to redress the regressive
impact of the policy changes of the previous 20 years:
• First, it has increased the value of the means tested minimum
significantly, as figure 11 shows, renaming it first as the
Minimum Income Guarantee, and then as the guarantee
credit of the Pension Credit. The assumption of current policy
is that the value of this will continue to rise with earnings
growth (while the basic pension remains price linked).
• Second, from October 2003 it extended means tested support
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through the Pension Credit to pensioners with small incomes
that put them just above the means tested minimum. As with
the reforms for working families illustrated above, the effect
of this is to reduce the sharpest part of means testing, but to
extend a milder form of it over a wider range of income. If
indexation continues as in recent years, the scope of Pension
Credit will steadily widen. Some estimates suggest that over
60 per cent of pensioners would eventually be affected by
Pension Credit withdrawal.
• Third, it has changed the rules of SERPS – renaming it as the
State Second Pension (S2P) – to increase its value for low
earners. This will over time make its value considerably less
earnings related and more flat rate than SERPS.
These reforms interact in a complicated way, and one that will
change over time. Figure 14 gives one impact of the long run
effect if current indexation rules continue. This shows state
support on retirement in 1978, 1998 and projected for 2038, for
a simple case of a single person whose earnings had
(unrealistically) equalled the same proportion of the national
average through his or her working life.6
• The solid line shows the position for someone retiring back in
1978, before SERPS was introduced. Both the basic pension
and the minimum income guaranteed by what was then
Supplementary Benefit were around 25 per cent of average
earnings, so state support was virtually flat rate.
• The lighter dashed line shows the position for those retiring
in 1998, when earnings related rights through SERPS were at
their highest, but both Income Support and the basic state
pension had fallen in relation to average earnings. State
support had fallen for low earners, but had risen for higher
earners.7
• The heavier dashed line shows a projection of state support in
2038 if current indexation policies continue. The minimum
level of state support would, as now, be higher than in 1998
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in relation to earnings (figure 11). For those with lifetime
earnings below three quarters of the adult average, the level
of support would also be higher than in 1998 as a result of the
combined State Second Pension and Pension Credit reforms.
However, for average and above average earners,
entitlements would be lower (reflecting a considerable fall in
the basic pension in relation to average earnings, as well as
slower accrual of rights to the State Second Pension).8
What perhaps stands out from the diagram is the extent to
which the effect of the reforms of the last few years has been
to unwind the earnings related pensions introduced by Labour
(and associated with Barbara Castle) in the late 1970s,
eventually returning the support given by the system to
something not so far from the original flat rate system of 1978
(itself dating from the reforms of the Attlee government in
1948). The emerging system does this in a far more complex
way, however, with much more reliance on means testing. 
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The combination of the impact of these social policy changes
and the macroeconomic story of the last quarter century has led
to contrasting fortunes for different parts of the income
distribution and kinds of family. Figure 15, based on analysis by
the Institute for Fiscal Studies, contrasts what has happened to
the annual growth rates of net incomes (adjusted for family
size) of those in successive fifths of the income distribution
under the last three prime ministers (up to 2002/03 for Tony
Blair).
While Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister, incomes at the top
grew rapidly. Lower down the distribution they grew much less
fast, and at the bottom by very little. Average living standards
grew, but income inequality widened rapidly, and the poor fell
behind. During the Major years, the growth in inequality was
partly reversed, but there was only slow growth in living
standards for any of the groups. After 1997, all income groups
enjoyed quite rapid growth in living standards. This has only
meant a slow decline in relative poverty, but it did involve much
faster growth in living standards for the poor than either of the
earlier periods, and so resulted in rapid falls in absolute poverty.
For many concerned with disadvantage, the latest period is
clearly preferable to the other two, even though it has not
resulted in a fall in inequality between the incomes of the top
and the bottom. Indeed, inequality between the very top and
the very bottom was still greater in 2002/03 than it had been in
1996/97. It was, however, falling if measured between those
near the top and those near the bottom (Sefton and
Sutherland, 2005).
Figure 16 gives a more detailed view of the changes in
relative poverty over the last 40 years that we previously
showed in figure 5, showing the composition of the population
with incomes below half the contemporary average. Key
features include:
• Overall relative poverty, which had been about 10 per cent of
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Figure 15:  Real income growth by quintile group (% per year)
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(b) Major: 1990 to 1996/97
(c) Blair: 1996/97 to 2002/03
Note: The figures for each quintile group correspond to their mid points (i.e. the 10th, 30th, 50th,
70th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution). Incomes are before housing costs.
Source:   Brewer et al. (2004), Fig. 2.3.
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the population in the 1960s, dipped to a low point of 6 per
cent in 1977, but then grew very rapidly through the 1980s to
peak at 21 per cent in the early 1990s. After a dip and then
rise back in the mid 1990s it has fallen slowly since 1996/97. It
is still three times its level of the mid 1970s.
• Pensioners made up a much greater proportion of the poor
population in the 1960s than they do now. None the less,
poor pensioners now represent as great a proportion of the
whole population – nearly 5 per cent – as they did then.
• Families with children have become a much greater part of
the poor population, not just lone parents and their children,
but also two parent families. Most recently, their poverty
rates have been falling.
• By contrast, there has been no recent fall in poverty rates for
working age single people and couples without children.
Table 10 illustrates this last point in a little more detail for
the period since 1979, in this case using poverty lines based on
the current official measure of 60 per cent of median income. It
shows poverty rates both in relative terms in the upper panel
and against a fixed real line in the lower panel. For the 1996/97
to 2002/03 period, it shows how the slight fall in poverty rates
for people of working age has resulted from a fall in poverty
for those with children – falling child poverty has to involve
falling parent poverty – but a rise in poverty for working age
adults without children. While some of this group have
benefited from New Labour’s welfare-to-work programmes and
the buoyant economy, others still dependent on benefits have
had living standards which have fallen in relative terms.
The lower panel of the table gives a measure, however, of
just how hard it is to achieve reductions against the moving
target of a relative poverty standard when overall living
standards are rising as fast as those shown in figure 15. Instead,
it shows poverty rates against a fixed real standard – of the
kind, for instance, used to measure official poverty rates in the
US. Fewer people were poor in 1996/97 against this fixed line
The last quarter century
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than had been in 1979. The fall was particularly large for
pensioners, but much less for children, despite the increase of
more than 40 per cent in average real incomes. In the period
since 1996/97, the rate of fall has been faster. Indeed, child
poverty against this kind of standard more than halved in just
six years.
These figures are the most recent available at the time of
writing, but do not take into account some of the largest
changes that have been made by New Labour, those associated
with the introduction of the Child and Working Tax Credits in
April 2003 (replacing the Working Families Tax Credit –
successor to Family Credit – and the child allowances previously
in Income Support), and of the Pension Credit in October 2003.
The last quarter century
Table 10: Trends in poverty against relative and absolute income
thresholds
1979 1996/971 2002/03
Relative poverty: income below 60% of contemporary median (%):
All 12 18 17
Children 12 25 21
Pensioners 28 21 21
Working age adults 7 15 14
of which those with children n/a 19 16
of which those without children n/a 12 13
Absolute poverty: income below 60% of 1996/97 median in 
real terms (%):
All 30 18 10
Children 34 25 12
Pensioners 62 21 12
Working age adults 19 15 10
of which those with children n/a 19 10
of which those without children n/a 12 9
Note: Based on net equivalised household incomes before housing costs.
1 1996/97 is financial year. These and later figures are for GB (earlier
figures are for UK).
Source: Sefton and Sutherland (2005), based on DWP (2004).
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Modelling work suggests that these changes will add to the
redistributive effects of the reforms. Figure 17 shows the results
of one such exercise. It shows the effect on the incomes of
successive tenths of the income distribution if one compares the
actual 2004/05 tax and benefit system with the system that
would have been in place if the 1997 system had been retained,
simply uprated for price inflation.
Two things are clear from this. First, the reforms overall have
been progressive, with the largest proportionate gains for the
lower income groups. Second, it is pensioners and families with
children that have been the largest gainers – gains equivalent
to a quarter or more of income for those in the poorest tenth.
On average, there has been little effect on people of working
age without children, although even here there have been
gains for some with low incomes (reflecting some reforms such
as the National Minimum Wage and changes to National
Insurance contributions as well as the Working Tax Credit,
which now goes to some without children). Using this
modelling, Sefton and Sutherland (2005, table 11.5) project
that, other things being equal, the poverty rates shown in table
10 would fall further by 2004/05 to 15 per cent for children, 19
per cent for pensioners (each from 21 per cent in 2002/03), but
would remain at 13 per cent for working age people without
children. This would mean that the government would hit (on
this basis, measuring incomes before deducting housing costs)
its target for cutting child poverty by a quarter.
There is one caveat to this way of measuring the impact of
policy on poverty. This is that the base used in figure 17 is that
of the 1997 system adjusted only for price inflation. It could be
argued that this gives an unduly positive impression of the
impact of New Labour’s policies at the bottom. After all, the
comparison being made is with a world where (price linked)
benefit rates would be falling behind other living standards,
and so relative poverty rates would be rising. At the same time,
tax revenues would be rising faster than national income, as
‘fiscal drag’ pulled more people into the tax net and into higher
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tax rates. This would not be a ‘steady state’ – the public finances
would be continually improving while the poor were left
behind.
As an alternative, the actual system can be compared with
what it would have looked like if the 1997 tax and benefit
system had been adjusted by earnings growth – in other words
one where an ‘Old Labour’ policy of uprating benefits in line
with earnings had been followed, but without any reform. If
this is done, similar modelling suggests that the actual 2004/05
system produces almost identical average household incomes to
an earnings adjusted 1997 system (Hills, 2004a, fig. 9.5). Overall,
New Labour’s reforms have been fiscally neutral compared with
the hypothetical ‘Old Labour’ alternative. However, the bottom
five-tenths of the income distribution as a whole are better off
with New Labour’s reforms than they would have been under
earnings indexation, while the top four-tenths are worse off.
On this kind of comparison, New Labour’s reforms actually
come out as more clearly redistributive from those with high
incomes to those with low incomes (especially to families with
children).
The contribution of social science to the recent debate
During the 1980s and indeed right up to 1997, the discussion of
‘poverty’ passed out of official currency. This was despite – or
even because of – the way in which government policies were
compounding the growth of inequality. But at the same time
poverty re-emerged as a focus for social research in a way it had
not done since the nineteenth century and the 1960s. Strikingly,
an important facilitator was television.
London Weekend Television commissioned the polling
organisation MORI to conduct a survey as background to a
series of four programmes on ‘Breadline Britain’. Two of the
programme’s writers, Joanna Mack and Stewart Lansley,
discussed the survey with social policy academics – Vic George,
Peter Townsend, David Piachaud, Richard Berthoud and Peter
Taylor-Gooby, a roll call of the leading poverty analysts of the
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day. They came up not just with a new survey, but a new
conceptual approach to the whole problem. As we discussed in
chapter 5, Townsend (1979) had argued that poverty was
socially constructed and depended on individuals’ capacity to
be included in the mainstream of society. The question was,
how to decide which activities and items were necessary for
such inclusion? What income was needed for participation?
Townsend’s view (1979, ch. 6) was that he could construct such
a line statistically from consumption patterns. Others disagreed,
arguing that, in the end, poverty was a subjective social
measure of what people thought was a minimum below which
people should not live. The way to find that out was to ask the
population, not just rely on experts. The approach of Mack and
Lansley (1985) was to ask a sample of the whole population
what items they thought were necessities, and then use
majority views of this to define which items people should not
go without. They could then identify who was poor as lacking
such necessities because they could not afford them. This
approach has since been repeated in other studies, including
the 1999 Poverty and Social Exclusion Survey of Britain (Gordon
et al., 2000).
This approach owed much to the work of Amartya Sen
(1983), an economist whose work included the study of famines
and who had debated the concept of poverty with Townsend in
the 1960s. There is, Sen argued, an ‘absolutist core’ to poverty.
Starvation and death are not relative concepts, and in the
developing world they are the key to poverty. Yet his work
provided a framework that took the debate beyond just
‘absolute’ versus ‘relative’ concepts of need. Adam Smith had
framed poverty in terms of being able to ‘appear in public
without shame’. Sen’s ‘capabilities’ framework developed the
way in which such benchmarks for participation depended on
the society and time within which people lived. This has had a
major influence on the notions of poverty employed by the
United Nations Development Programme in its annual reports
and on the UN Copenhagen Agreement in 1995. This
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committed signatories to eradicating poverty through national
actions and international cooperation. It distinguished
‘absolute’ and ‘overall’ poverty and led to attempts to give
these terms distinct meanings (Gordon et al., 2000; Gordon and
Townsend, 2000).
Within the UK, evidence accumulated through the 1980s of
the extent to which there had been a dramatic shift in income
distribution, not least from official statistics such as the new
Households Below Average Income analysis. In 1992 the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation commissioned a programme to research
this and bring all the evidence together, and also an Inquiry
Group chaired by one of its trustees, Sir Peter Barclay, to
consider the implications of the findings (Barclay, 1995; Hills,
1995). When the Inquiry Group’s report was published in 1995,
its findings and concerns resonated widely; indeed public
concerns about the gap between rich and poor reached a peak
that year. As in Charles Booth’s and Seebohm Rowntree’s time,
hard empirical evidence made such concerns more difficult to
ignore.
Summary
The last quarter century has seen large swings in policy towards
poverty. The priority of fighting poverty was greatly reduced in
the 1980s, and reforms were made to social security, taxation
and public spending that were intended to improve incentives
and economic growth. As unemployment grew and society
changed, many more people found themselves depending on
social security benefits that were falling behind average living
standards. As a result of both factors, poverty grew. However
social spending remained much the same share of national
income, and the growth of means testing had negative effects
on incentives, both despite the intentions of the reforms. Since
1997, New Labour has followed a mixture of policies, with
reducing child and pensioner poverty of increasing importance.
Its macroeconomic success in maintaining steady growth and
falling unemployment has helped, but it has had to grapple
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with much the same underlying pressures and dilemmas –
specifically how to make progress against poverty when there
are escalating demands on social spending for other purposes,
and when political pressure to keep down tax rates remains as
tight as ever. It is to such pressures that we turn in the next
chapter, and then in the final chapter to ways in which this
conflict might work out over the next 20 years.






Where are we now? The UK in international perspective
One of the factors which has helped push poverty, particularly
child poverty, up the policy agenda in recent years has been the
body of evidence on Britain’s comparatively dismal record by
comparison with other countries.1 Table 11 gives the position in
15 comparable countries (members of the European Union or of
the ‘G7’ major industrialised countries) in 2000 or the nearest
available year, based on Luxembourg Income Study analysis of
national data sources on a comparable basis. It shows poverty
rates based on a line of 60 per cent of each country’s own
median income, together with a measure of severe poverty
(numbers below a line of 40 per cent of median income in each
country).
Overall, only the US and Ireland had worse relative poverty
rates, only the US had a worse child poverty rate, and only
Ireland a worse poverty rate for its elderly population. In four
countries, the child poverty rate was less than half that in the
UK, and in two the poverty rate for the elderly was less than half
that here. Against the severe threshold of 40 per cent of median
income, the UK was not so far above the average, but its level
was still the fourth worst shown. By contrast, in one of the
earliest uses of this data source, Mitchell (1991) found that in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the UK had the lowest poverty rate
against a severe poverty line out of the 10 countries examined.
7 Policy challenges and dilemmas
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From some perspectives a poor performance in relative
poverty rates might be seen as less serious if a country’s income
was so high that the absolute standard of living of its poor
population was still high by comparison with living standards
elsewhere. However, analysis by UNICEF (2000) of the position
in the mid 1990s suggests that even on this kind of comparison
the UK was doing badly in terms of child poverty. It calculated
child poverty rates against a fixed international standard, based
on the US poverty line (converted at purchasing power parities).
This showed the UK to have a child poverty rate of 29 per cent
against this standard, better only than that in Italy and Spain
within the EU, and twice the rate in the US.2
There are now indications that the UK’s international
position is improving. Figure 18, for instance, shows that in the
indicators published by the European Commission, the UK
Table 11: International comparison of relative poverty rates, 2000 or
late 1990s (% of population)
Below 60% of Below 40% 
population median of median
All Children Elderly
United States (2000) 23.8 30.2 33.3 10.8
Ireland (1996) 21.8 23.6 41.5 4.0
United Kingdom (1999) 21.3 27.0 34.9 5.7
Italy (2000) 19.9 26.5 22.2 7.3
Canada (1998) 19.7 23.8 21.5 7.6
Denmark (1997) 17.1 14.5 30.5 5.7
Belgium (1997) 14.4 13.7 22.7 3.3
Austria (1997) 14.2 17.3 22.7 3.3
France (1994) 14.1 14.3 18.5 3.4
Germany (2000) 13.1 11.2 21.2 4.9
Netherlands (1999) 12.7 14.8 12.8 4.6
Luxembourg (2000) 12.5 18.3 10.5 1.4
Finland (2000) 12.4 8.0 24.8 2.1
Norway (2000) 12.3 7.5 28.9 2.9
Sweden (2000) 12.3 9.2 21.2 3.8
Source: Hills (2004a), table 3.6 (based on Luxembourg Income Study).
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moved from having the worst relative child poverty rate in the
EU in the year up to 1997, to fifth worst in the year up to 2001.
The rate in the UK fell, while it rose in most other EU countries.
None the less, there was still a long way to go for the UK to fall
to the EU average, let alone to reach the government’s target
of being ‘among the best in Europe’ by 2020.
The same data source suggests little change in the rate of
adult poverty in the UK over that period, but a deterioration in
five of the other EU members (Stewart, 2005b, fig. 14.2). Within
this, there was a very slight fall in poverty among the retired
population in the UK, but this contrasted with increases in eight
other member states.













Note: Poverty line is 60% of equivalised household median income.
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The picture of recent improvements in the UK, particularly
against absolute standards, is confirmed by figure 19. This
shows the reduction in the proportion of the population
counted as poor between 1998 and 2001 within each EU
member state, using both relative and absolute standards.
Against a relative standard, the UK’s performance was the best
in Europe, and against an absolute standard it was one of the
four recording the largest falls.
Ireland’s position is notable here: its combination of rapid
growth in average living standards combined with a smaller but
still significant increase in real incomes for the poorest meant
that it had both the fastest growth in relative poverty, and
Figure 19: Change in numbers in poverty between 1998 and 2001
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fastest fall against an absolute standard. This illustrates the
importance of looking at movements in both relative and
absolute incomes in trying to understand the position of the
poor. Under the ‘tiered’ approach the British government is
now taking to tracking what is happening to child poverty, it
will be seen to be falling unambiguously only when both
measures, and a third including indicators of material
deprivation, are all falling (HM Treasury, 2004, p. 17). 
The UK’s poor record on poverty in international terms can
be traced back to a number of factors, each of which gives a
clue to policies that might help reduce it. First, the UK has a
high proportion of households without income from work.
While its recorded unemployment rate is now one of the lowest
in the EU, it still has one of the largest proportions of working
age adults in jobless households overall, a manifestation of the
growth of economic inactivity discussed in chapter 6 (Hills,
2004a, table 3.7). Its rate of 10.9 per cent of those aged 18–59
living in jobless households in 2003 was exceeded only in
Belgium. This is a particularly important driver of child poverty
– in the mid 1990s a fifth of all children in the UK were in
workless households, double the OCED average and the highest
of 18 countries surveyed by Gregg and Wadsworth (2001). By
2003, the rate had fallen a little, but was still the highest in the
EU (Hills, 2004a, table 3.7). As figure 20 shows, this is partly
driven by the combination of a high rate of lone parenthood –
only New Zealand and the US exceed the UK’s 22 per cent rate –
and the low proportion of lone parents who are employed. This
latter factor has been changing recently, with a 10 percentage
point increase in the employment rate of lone mothers from 44
per cent in 1996 to 54 per cent in 2002 (HM Treasury, 2003a,
chart 4.4). Whether the current government’s target of a 70 per
cent employment rate for lone mothers by 2010 can be reached
is an open question but, as the figure shows, many other
countries do achieve something close to this or higher.
A second factor is the low level of social security benefits for
those out of work in the UK in relation to poverty standards, in
Policy challenges and dilemmas for the next 20 years













































0 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

















































































































































































35 28 21 14 7 0





























































European terms at least. Figure 21, based on work by Behrendt
(2002), shows social assistance entitlements in relation to
median incomes and hence relative poverty lines in the mid
1990s in Sweden, Britain and Germany for six different family
types. In the Swedish case, social assistance rates are above the
poverty line for all six cases, and in the German case in three of
them, but in the UK all of them fell short (although a pensioner
couple came close to it). Since then, UK social assistance (Income
Support) rates have fallen further behind median incomes for
most of these cases, although they have improved recently for
families with children and pensioners. For a lone parent with
two children, Income Support rates exceeded 60 per cent of
median income by 2004/05 (Stewart, 2005b, fig. 14.12). But for
working age adults without children, Income Support rates are
well below the effective poverty line. As a result, the UK has
one of the highest poverty rates for the unemployed in the EU
– just under half in 2001 on the basis used by the EU,3 compared
to under 40 per cent in the EU as a whole.
But the UK also has a relatively high rate of poverty among
those with income from work – 28 per cent of working single
parents and 19 per cent of single earner couples in 2001,
compared with EU averages of 22 and 20 per cent respectively
(Stewart, 2005b, fig. 14.9). In the case of lone parents, this
reflects the gender gap in pay generally, but also high rates of
part-time working and the particularly low rates of pay for
women working part-time in the UK (Harkness and Waldfogel,
2003).
But the UK’s problem of low pay is wider than this. As figure
22 shows, the UK had one of the largest increases in wage
inequality between 1980 and 2000 of the ten countries shown
– only New Zealand and the US had a larger increase, and three
of the ten had a decline. This divergence in experiences
suggests that we cannot look solely for global explanations for
the increase in the incidence of low pay in the UK. It is true that
unskilled workers in many industrialised countries have been
hit by ‘skill biased technological change’, and this has driven
Policy challenges and dilemmas for the next 20 years
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both unemployment and relative wages (Hills, 2004a, ch. 4). But
the UK has been hit worse than most. First, institutional
restraints on low pay weakened in the 1980s – both through
the decline of trade unions and the abolition of limited wage
protection through the wages councils. Second, Britain had a
relatively large number of unqualified workers to start with,
and therefore a larger proportion of the population was
potentially affected by both technological change and
developments in world trade. The UK’s unequal earnings
distribution is related to its unequal distribution of skills.4 These
Figure 22: International trends in wage differentials: ratios between











Note: Figures are for men and women.
Source: Hills (2004a), Fig. 4.6, based on OECD labour market statistics database.
1980 (or early 1980s)               2000 (or late 1990s)
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factors may interact – in countries where labour market
institutions have resisted growing wage dispersion, as in
continental Europe, this may have encouraged investment in
technologies that have increased the productivity of less skilled
workers, and hence slowed the extent to which technological
change has been skill biased by comparison with, say, the US
(Acemoglu, 2003). 
More recently, two factors have changed in the other
direction. The National Minimum Wage, introduced in 1999,
may not have affected a large proportion of workers so far, but
it has put a floor to further drift downwards right at the
bottom. At the same time, New Labour’s tax credit reforms
described in the previous chapter have increased net incomes
for those in low paid work, particularly, but not only, those with
children. By 2001 the UK had one of the most generous ‘child
benefit packages’ in the world for low paid workers, if we look
across support through the tax and benefit system and help
with housing costs for families with children, compared with
those without children (Stewart, 2005b, table 14.2, based on
analysis in Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). This is a considerable
improvement on earlier international comparisons in the 1980s
and 1990s (although the means tested nature of the UK system
means that it is around the international average in terms of
support for families with children and on average earnings).
Finally, one feature of poverty in the UK – and in the US –
that stands out from recent international comparisons is that
when it occurs, poverty is more likely to be persistent here than
in some other comparable countries. For instance, an OECD
comparison of poverty durations in the early 1990s suggested
that for those who were affected by poverty in a six year
period, the average duration was 2.4 years or less in the
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Canada, but 3.0 years or
more in the UK and US (Oxley, Dang and Antolín, 1999).
Accelerating the rate at which those who fall into poverty can
escape it would have a major effect on the proportion of the
UK population who are poor at any one time.
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What do we want? Public attitudes, poverty and policy
In considering how policy towards poverty might develop, a
crucial factor is what the public as a whole thinks – either
because policy makers will have to operate within the
constraints of those attitudes, or because attitudes might have
to change before policy can follow. Here responses to the long-
running British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey have given very
enlightening information, now stretching over 20 years.5
First, the survey has consistently shown unhappiness with the
extent of income inequality in Britain. For instance, in 2002, 82
per cent of respondents to the survey said they thought that
‘the gap between those with high incomes and those with low
incomes is too large’, with only 13 per cent thinking it is ‘about
right’, and very few that it is too small. The proportion agreeing
is higher now than it was 20 years ago, when income inequality
itself was less, but even in 1983 more than 70 per cent agreed
(Hills, 2004a, fig. 2.11). Furthermore, this inequality is not seen
as functional: in 1999, 54 per cent of respondents rejected the
idea that ‘large differences in income are necessary for Britain’s
prosperity’, with only 17 per cent agreeing (Jowell et al., 2000,
p. 324).
Second, the survey produces support for the idea that people
see ‘poverty’ as being at least in some way related to
contemporary living standards. When offered three definitions
of poverty, around 60 per cent of the population say that
someone would be in poverty if they had ‘enough to eat and
live, but not enough to buy other things they needed’ (Hills,
2004a, table 3.8). This is clearly more than a bare subsistence
level, but how much more – and how what constitutes ‘poverty’
changes over time – will depend on what people class as
‘needs’. Here the results of the 1999 Poverty and Social
Exclusion Survey of Britain (PSE survey) indicate that as general
prosperity grows, so does the range of goods and activities that
people see as necessities. The PSE survey asked, as did the
earlier ‘Breadline Britain’ surveys in 1983 and 1990, whether
people thought that particular activities or possessions were
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‘necessary, which all adults should be able to afford and which
they should not have to go without’. For instance, in 1983 only
43 per cent thought that a telephone was a necessity; by 1999
72 per cent thought it was (Gordon et al., 2000, table 12).
Similarly, in the 1983 and 1990 surveys, fewer than 40 per cent
thought that the ability to ‘have friends and family round for a
meal, snack or drink’ was a necessity; by 1999 65 per cent
thought that it was.
Further evidence that people see poverty in largely relative
terms can be seen in table 12. When asked what they thought
had happened to poverty over the previous ten years, half of
respondents in 1986 and 1989 said it had been increasing – two
thirds in 1994 – and just under a third that it was steady – a
quarter in 1994. Few thought it had been decreasing. By 2000,
roughly equal numbers thought poverty had been steady over
the 1990s as thought it had increased. Looking back at table 10
and figure 16 in the last chapter, these perceptions are
consistent with the trends shown in poverty against a relative
line. They are not consistent with people taking an absolute
view – if they had, they would have reported poverty as
decreasing in the ten-year periods up to 1994 and particularly
up to 2000. 
As to the level of the poverty line, the BSA survey regularly
asks respondents whether people receiving particular benefits
or with certain incomes have enough to live on. Two features of
the results are notable. First, when asked about people
receiving benefits while unemployed, respondents are more
likely to say they have enough to live on than when they are
told the actual weekly income the benefits give (although in
both cases a majority say the people would not have enough to
live on). Second, the results suggest that when asked about the
incomes equating to the 60 per cent of median income line,
about half of respondents say this is enough to live on, about
half that it is not (Hills, 2004a, table 3.13). Below these levels,
large proportions say that income is not enough to live on. In
other words, the closest we have to an ‘official’ poverty line
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appears roughly in line with the views of the median
respondent.6
Agreement that poverty exists and has been increasing does
not necessarily mean that people think government should do
something about it. However, in 2000 only 23 per cent blamed
‘laziness or lack of willpower’ for people’s own poverty. The
majority blamed factors outside individual control – bad luck
(15 per cent); ‘an inevitable part of modern life’ (34 per cent);
and ‘injustice in our society’ (21 per cent) (Hills, 2004a, table
3.14). It is true that the proportion blaming individual factors is
higher than in earlier years (19 per cent in 1986 and 1994, and
15 per cent in 1994), and the proportion doing so is the highest
in the European Union apart from Portugal (Gallie and Paugam,
2002). However, most people in the UK clearly see poverty as
the result of factors outside individual control.7 Furthermore,
only 28 per cent respondents to the BSA in 1994 agreed that,
‘British governments nowadays can do very little to reduce
poverty’; 70 per cent thought they could do ‘quite a bit’. Since
the 1980s, a majority has agreed – 58 per cent in 2000 – that ‘it
is the responsibility of government to reduce the difference in
income between people with high incomes and people with
low incomes’. In 1998, just over half (53 per cent) said that
‘government should increase taxes on the better-off to spend
more on the poor’, with only a sixth preferring an alternative
statement that ‘the better-off pay too much tax already’ (Hills
and Lelkes, 1999).
Table 12: Perceptions of trends in poverty in Britain over past ten years,
1986–2000, GB (%)
1986 1989 1994 2000
Increasing 51 50 68 37
Staying at same level 30 31 24 38
Decreasing 15 16 6 20
Base 1548 1516 1167 3426
Source: Hills (2004a), table 3.11, based on British Social Attitudes survey.
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All this suggests public backing for anti-poverty policies – if
they too can go with the grain of public opinion. In selecting
policies governments may be more constrained, as table 13
suggests. When people are asked whether government should
spend more on ‘welfare benefits’ for the poor, even if it means
higher taxes, more agree (44 per cent in 2002) than disagree (26
per cent). But the balance in favour has narrowed since the
1980s and early 1990s. Similarly, the balance, while still in
favour, of the proposition that ‘government should redistribute
income from the better-off to those who are less well-off’ has
also narrowed over the period. The most important items
within the social security budget – pensions, benefits for
disabled people, and support for families with children on low
wages – command support for increases, but benefits for the
unemployed do not. Scepticism about the latter appears to
reflect worries about the disincentive effects of benefits and
the extent of fraud that became stronger over the 1990s (Hills,
2004a, figs 6.11–13). Instead, people believe that government
should make sure that anyone who can work should be
guaranteed a job. In short, the New Labour slogan of ‘work for
those who can, security for those who cannot’ has strong public
Table 13: Attitudes towards redistribution and welfare benefits,
1987–2002, GB (%)
1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor
Agree 55 61 58 53 50 43 43 38 44
Neither 23 23 23 25 25 29 29 31 27
Disagree 22 15 18 20 23 26 26 30 26
Government should redistribute income to the less well-off
Agree 45 50 49 45 51 44 39 39 39
Neither 20 20 20 21 23 26 28 24 25
Disagree 33 29 29 33 25 28 31 36 34
Base 1281 2604 2481 2567 2929 3085 2531 2980 2929
Source: Hills (2004a), table 8.3, based on British Social Attitudes survey.
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resonance. Whether what is being done to deliver it is enough,
and whether views would be different if there was wider
knowledge of just how low some benefit levels are, are
different questions.
The unfinished agenda? The JRF Income and Wealth
Inquiry ten years on
In February 1995 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s Income
and Wealth Inquiry Group, chaired by Sir Peter Barclay,
published its report. The group, with a broadly based
membership, had been convened by the Foundation as
evidence accumulated on the extent to which income
inequality and relative poverty had grown since the late 1970s.8
It reviewed evidence, both from official sources and from a
research programme specially commissioned by the
Foundation. Most of the statistical evidence available then
covered the period up to between 1991 and 1993.
The group concluded that ‘Policy-makers should be
concerned with the way in which the living standards of a
substantial minority of the population have lagged behind
since the late 1970s. Not only is this a problem for those directly
affected, it also damages the social fabric and so affects us all’
(Barclay, 1995, p. 8). Given that conclusion, the group produced
a wide-ranging series of recommendations, headline versions of
which are listed in box 3. As well as this list of specific measures,
the Inquiry Group argued that ‘It is hard to overstate the
importance of raising education and training standards in
Britain . . . Nor is it a matter of choosing where to redirect
existing resources at the expense of currently favoured sectors;
greater investment is required at virtually every level’ (Barclay,
1995, p. 10). Tony Blair’s three priorities of ‘education,
education, and education’ before the 1997 election sounded a
similar note (although the new investment did not come until
after 1999).
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1  Direct provision of No.
employment opportunities.
2  Greatly increased childcare Yes – but more emphasis 
provision. on subsidies than provision.
3  More flexibility in working Can now request.
time.
4  Strengthened legislation Yes (e.g. Disability 
against discrimination, Discrimination Act).
including disabled people.
5  Subsidies to take on long In New Deal.
term unemployed.
6  Minimum wage and/or Both.
more in-work benefits.
7  Review of social security No.
for part-timers and self 
employed.
Social security – out of work
8  Benefits should rise by more Generally inflation only,
than inflation. unless have children.
9  More Social Fund grants, Increases in funds for some 
not loans. forms of grant.
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Recommendation Outcome
10  If on benefit: 
(a) Relaxed rules on No major change.
education;
(b) More work training with Training options under 
allowances; New Deals.
(c) No ‘long term’ In New Deal.
unemployment without 
work offer;
(d) Training guarantee; In New Deal.
(e) Wider entitlement for No.
16–17 year olds;
(f) Easier to do voluntary Partly.
work.
11  Think again about 6 month No.
limit on non-means tested 
Jobseeker’s Allowance.
12  Disregard of maintenance New Income Support 





Between benefits and work
13  Speed up calculation and New structure of Child Tax 
payment of in-work Credit means payment 
benefits. continues on move into
low-paid work, but initial
problems with tax credit
administration. Some
benefit ‘run-ons’ extended.
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Recommendation Outcome
14  Easier reactivation of Yes.
Income Support claims.
15  More publicity for ‘trial Yes.
periods’ in work.
16  Fixed allowance for long Principle of fund available 
term benefit recipients for both benefits and other 
trying to get back to work. costs of getting to work is
part of Employment Zones.
17  Lump sum payment on Yes – £100 Job Grant (and 
return to work. complex system of back-to-
work bonus for those with
earnings while on benefit).
18  Higher earnings disregard No.
in Income Support, with 
possibility to accumulate 
over 6 weeks.
19  Disregard of childcare and Childcare tax credit now 
work expenses. helps with childcare costs 
in work.
20  Restore free school meals No.
to those on Family Credit.
21  Reduced benefit Reduced for Child Tax 
withdrawal rates in Family Credit and Working Tax 
Credit and Housing Benefit. Credit, but not for Housing
Benefit (although reduced





22  Need for political consensus. No.
23  ‘Clear encouragement’ for Incentive for additional 
all income groups to accumulation increased for 
accumulate private pension some as a result of Pension 
rights. Credit, but reduced for
others.
24  Avoid extension of means No – means testing 
testing. widened. 
25  Floor to retirement incomes Yes – on means tested 
rising faster than price basis, if Guarantee Credit 
indexation. claimed.
Taxation
26  Reduced share of tax on Yes – if tax credits included.
low incomes.
27  Restructuring of National Yes.
Insurance contributions for 
low paid.
28  Review of taxation of ‘Gift Aid’ easier.
charities and greater 
incentives to donate.
Housing
29  Social rent levels should Depends on comparator.
be moderated.
30  (a) Avoid concentrated ‘Choice-based lettings’ in
allocations; some areas.
(b) New developments – In part.
tenure mix.
Policy challenges and dilemmas for the next 20 years




31  Need for strategy to Yes – National 
revitalise marginalised Strategy for 
areas. Neighbourhood Renewal.
32  Specific items:
(a) Involvement of business Represented on Local 
leaders; Strategic Partnerships, but 
without a major role.
(b) Training link with Some examples. 
employers;
(c) Local managers with Within some initiatives, not 
decentralised budgets others.
and resident involvement;
(d) Long-term support Not many examples.
workers;
(e) Resident training; Yes – ‘capacity building’ 
programmes.
(f) Radical improvement in Improvement in primary 
local schools; schools; less evidence in 
secondary schools.
(g) Positive role for young Some examples, such as
people; ‘Young Movers’.
(h) Improved transport; Very variable.
(i) Economic regeneration Limited.
for certain regions 
beyond estate initiatives.
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Alongside the list in the box is a short note of what has
happened to related policy since then. This gives a convenient
checklist against which to compare recent policy developments
summarised in the previous chapter. An immediate observation
is that there is a substantial overlap between the Inquiry
Group’s recommendations and policy as it has developed since
1997. Roughly half of the 46 recommendations itemised in the
box have been adopted largely as suggested, and only 8 have
clearly not been followed. In some respects policy has gone
further than the Inquiry Group argued for – notably perhaps
the child poverty commitments and structure of the new tax
credits, the labour market measures associated with the New
Deal, and some aspects of the National Strategy for
Neighbourhood Renewal. The differences also highlight some
key features of New Labour policy:
• Policy as it has developed has more emphasis on means
testing than implied by the Inquiry Group, particularly for
pensioners, but also for the unemployed.
• While low income pensioners and those with children have
benefited from above inflation increases in benefits (and tax
credits), working age people without children have not.
• While the New Deals have gone further in many ways than
the Inquiry Group programme, there has not been much by
way of ‘direct provision of employment opportunities’, and
the benefit treatment of those remaining unemployed has
generally remained tougher than several of the Group’s
recommendations suggested.
• Policy has covered a wider range of issues than touched on by
the Inquiry Group, for instance, in some of the groups of
vulnerable young people focused on by the Social Exclusion
Unit and related policy change, the emphasis now being
given to early years policy, and the attention – if limited
specific action9 – devoted to health inequalities.
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A striking feature of New Labour has been the lack of emphasis
on inequality overall – between top and bottom – as a focus of
policy since 1997, as opposed to the strong focus on inequality
between the bottom and the middle. What is also clear is that
despite the many areas in which there have been policy
initiatives, there are still gaps. The discussion above highlights
the position of working age adults without children who are
dependent on benefits. Other groups have also had their rights
reduced by other aspects of government policy – most notably
asylum seekers (Burchardt, 2005): the commitment to ‘inclusion’
has, literally, had borders.
Constraints and pressures on future policy
Public opinion is not the only constraint on policy makers.
Looking ahead, there is little sign that life will become easier
for those trying to reconcile public demands for a more equal
society, public services that meet the demands of an ageing and
more affluent society, and political constraints on resources
available through taxation.10
The most obvious pressure comes from an ageing society. It is
not inherent in increased life expectancy that social spending
should increase as a share of income. After all, one could
imagine a world in which the ages at which all events related
to economic activity and social needs grew in proportion – ages
of entering education, leaving education and entering the
labour force, retirement, onset of greater medical and care
needs, and eventual mortality. The overall balance between
social spending and national income could stay the same
without strain – but with periods at work and periods receiving
transfers in cash and kind lengthened in proportion. But as
things have developed and seem likely to develop, this does not
appear to be happening:
• There is no sign of delay in entering education, quite the
reverse, but ages to which people remain in education are
rising.
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• Retirement ages have begun to creep back up in the last ten
years, but had previously fallen rather than risen as life
expectancies increased. Expectations for the future are still
dominated by the idea of retirement at a particular age – say,
65 – rather than one which relates to growing life
expectancies.
• Britain’s population structure has not been in a steady state.
Fertility rates have been in decline long term. This has been
masked by the ‘baby boom’ generation, born after the
Second World War, but when this generation reaches 65, the
ratio between those aged over 65 and those of working age
will rise sharply.
• We simply do not know how health and long term care needs
will develop as the population ages. An optimistic view would
be that needs would be delayed until people were older – this
would actually put off needs for social spending, and help the
public finances. Alternatively, such needs could remain the
same for people of any given age, and so pressures on social
spending would increase fast as a greater proportion of the
population exceeded any given age.
At the same time, the presumption that we will continue to
become a more affluent society does not necessarily help
things. If we could keep the salaries of doctors, teachers, nurses
and road-menders fixed indefinitely in real terms, the cost of
providing public services might fall in relation to national
income. However, the evidence is that if public sector pay lags
behind other incomes, there is eventually a period of catch-up
to cope with the problems of quality, retention, recruitment
and low morale. Equally, if productivity in providing services
grew fast enough, the share of GDP required could fall. The
problem is not necessarily that productivity does not improve –
but rather that public expectations for service quality, based on
experience elsewhere in the economy, rise just as fast. Even
worse, the very services where public provision is important –
health care and education – are ones to which people appear to
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want to devote an increasing proportion of their resources as
they become better off. As a result, quite apart from any factors
associated with ageing or tackling disadvantage, one might
expect the demands for social spending to rise as a share of
national income over time. There certainly seems little reason
to assume that they will fall as a result of economic growth.
Similarly, if we saw poverty in absolute terms, tackling it
would become easier as real incomes grew. Funding social
security benefits merely with a stable real value while incomes
(and taxes) are growing reduces the pressure on public finances
quite considerably, as we know from the last 20 years. However,
the evidence reviewed above suggests that views of poverty
and inclusion actually relate to contemporary living standards.
The real cost of relieving poverty in these terms rises as incomes
rise – unless other factors move rapidly in the right direction,
and incomes from other sources fill the gap.
To give an idea of the magnitude of these pressures, we can
calculate what would happen to social spending if we carried
on in future spending the same amount on each person of a
given age as we do now in relation to average incomes,
allowing for current official projections of the future age
structure of the population. Looking just at health, education
and social security, this would imply spending rising from 21.8
per cent of GDP in 2001 to 26.3 per cent of GDP in 2051 (Hills,
2004a, table 10.2). For some this will be seen as clearly feasible
– it is an increase of less than 0.4 per cent per year, and much of
the increase in health spending is already built into government
plans, for instance. For others, if translated into today’s money,
it would mean extra spending – and taxes – eventually of an
amount equivalent to £50 billion per year, a politically very
alarming figure if it was needed all at once. There are reasons
why fiscal life might be easier – the projected increase in life
expectancy might turn out to be mostly of ‘healthy’ life, for
instance, and both retirement ages and the age of onset of
health care needs could both rise. But there are probably more
factors that would make things harder – the calculation does
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not allow for making progress in reducing poverty, or for rising
long term care needs. The latter could be substantial.11
One of the things we do not know is whether the other
factors referred to above will ‘move in the right direction’, that
is in ways that reduce the market inequalities that the social
security and tax credit systems end up compensating for.
Economic growth in the last 20 years in the UK and US has been
associated with widening market inequalities. However, this has
not been the case in other countries, and in previous eras the
presumption was that income inequality would reduce as
economies developed. It would be optimistic to assume that the
trends of the last few years will suddenly reverse. On the other
hand, these trends are not inevitable, and policies towards the
labour market, minimum wages, skills, education,
discrimination, childhood poverty, disadvantaged areas and
investment may all make a difference to people’s ability to
derive incomes from the market.
Some of the pressures on the public finances can be kept in
check while making progress on poverty if there is more
reliance on ‘targeting’ services and benefits on the poorest.
Indeed, this has been an important part of the story of the last
seven years. But there are limits to how far this can be pushed.
On the one hand, figure 13 has already shown the wide income
range across which the quite high effective marginal tax rates
associated with the new tax credits now stretch. On top of
these come other income tested transfers from the state –
Education Maintenance Allowances for families with 16–17
year olds; student finance support worth at least £3,000 a year
for students from families with low or moderate incomes by
comparison with those with higher incomes; or repayment of
student loans at a rate of 9 per cent of earnings above a
threshold. Some families will face more than one of these at
once. Adding to them through further income testing means
either deepening or widening what was once the ‘poverty trap’
but which now affects those with incomes nearer to the
average.
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There is also a political problem: if the government is raising
taxes to improve public services, but all of the proceeds are
concentrated on the poorest, many voters will see little return
for their money. Of course, ensuring that the poorest gain
disproportionately is the aim of a poverty reduction strategy.
But a policy of ‘progressive universalism’ as New Labour has
tagged it (and has delivered in the case of support for children),
means that spending has to increase even faster than under a
policy where general needs are kept up with, but nothing extra
is done for the poor.
All of this leaves policy makers with some acute dilemmas:
there is public backing for a continuing assault on poverty, but
both the instruments and resources available to mount it look
likely to be even more tightly constrained in the next few years.
In the final chapter we discuss alternative ways in which these





More complex and difficult
When Seebohm Rowntree was writing a century ago he could
talk about poverty as it affected a relatively homogeneous
working class population in the town, York, that he studied.
What drove poverty could be narrowed down to a fairly narrow
set of factors, several of them related to variations in needs and
earnings capacity over the life cycle – large families, loss of
earnings due to sickness and old age without any other income
source.
Sixty years ago, Beveridge could take results from Rowntree’s
1899 and 1936 surveys to suggest that poverty could be tackled
without much by way of redistribution between social classes
through the combination of a social insurance system covering
old age and risks of unemployment and sickness, together with
a system of family allowances and a National Health Service.
Problems related to the life cycle and to risks to which most
were exposed could be dealt with through life cycle
redistribution and insurance. Even then, Beveridge was skating
over the problems of low pay and of what could really be
achieved without progressive ways of raising money and
redistribution between classes.
Today both the drivers of poverty and the policies that might
be marshalled to tackle it are more diverse, and the politics of
doing so correspondingly more complicated. Wider
conceptualisations of disadvantage increase the dimensions
8 Poverty and progress for the next
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across which failure to achieve inclusion is seen as a problem.
Problems have changed their shape as well – in 1899 children in
large families represented a major cost in money and cause of
poverty; now families are smaller but children also represent a
time cost that leads to earnings forgone for some parents but
also pressured lives for others.
But we have done better
So one conclusion from this review of the last century is that
some of the issues have become more complex. A second is that
increasing affluence by itself does not solve the problems or
necessarily make it easier for policy makers to do so. A third is,
however, that there have been periods when we have done
much better than recently. The post-war welfare state and full
employment may not have led to quite the abolition of poverty
suggested by Rowntree’s flawed analysis of his third survey of
York in 1950, but they certainly led to major progress by
comparison with the first half of the twentieth century. The
records of the Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s
were criticised at the time for slow progress in reducing poverty
and inequality, but some aspects of their records look enviable
today.1
A common factor in the periods of progress – and in the
areas where undoubted progress has been made since the mid
1990s – is that policies have simultaneously tackled the ‘causes
of social ills’ and worked to address their ill effects. Where it has
been assumed that poverty can be tackled through just one of
these, or that they are alternatives, we have been much less
successful. Hoping that economic growth will trickle down to
the poor or that welfare-to-work programmes by themselves
will solve working age poverty without any change in the
incomes of those remaining out of work have not worked. But
nor have strategies relying only on the redistribution of income
to ameliorate the impact of market income inequalities that
reflect much deeper differences in economic opportunity. This
is not just because the underlying problems are left untouched,
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but also because political support for such a strategy is much
harder to marshal.
The dynamics of anti-poverty policy
Rowntree’s insights in identifying the relationship between the
risk of poverty and the life cycle can be seen as an early example
of social science concern with the dynamics of poverty. Recent
analysis of this kind helps suggest fruitful areas for policy,
whether it is addressing intergenerational links between
childhood circumstances and later disadvantage, or the factors
associated with short term movements in and out of poverty.
This kind of approach also suggests that we should not be
seeing ‘passive’ and ‘active’ social policies as alternatives.
Rather we should be thinking about whether we have policies
that tackle all four of the quadrants shown in figure 23, which
divides policies according to whether they are concerned with
affecting the risk of something happening or affecting its
impact when it does, and whether they are concerned with
adverse or positive events. This suggests that policies can have
one or more of the following impacts:
• Prevention of an event or reduction of the risk of entering an
undesirable state – for instance, training to improve job
retention, or adaptations at work or in working patterns so
that people can continue working after the onset of an
impairment or a change in demands on them for caring.
• Promotion of exit or escape – for instance, ‘welfare to work’
policies to help people move out of unemployment or
economic inactivity.
• Protection from the impact of an event, for instance paying
benefits to those who become unemployed.
• Propulsion away from adverse circumstances by reinforcing
the benefits of exit – for instance, the effects of the in-work
benefits on the incomes of those leaving unemployment, or
post-employment support to ensure that the next career
move is upwards.
Poverty and progress for the next generation?
One hundred years of poverty and policy
166
Importantly, policies can have more than one of these impacts
at the same time. For instance, paying benefits and tax credits
to low income families with children may be ‘protective’ today
but may also have long run ‘preventive’ effects if children are
no longer growing up in poverty.
Gaps and challenges
From this point of view one of the great strengths of policy
towards poverty and social exclusion since 1997 has been that it
has been multifaceted, and the most promising parts of it – for
instance those concerned with childhood disadvantage – have
indeed begun to address all four of these impacts of
intervention at once. Given the multiplicity of drivers of
poverty, it makes sense to address it with multiple policies. It is
hard to see anything in the current policy mix of which we need
less if we are to make real progress (Hills and Stewart, 2005).
But there are gaps and challenges still to address, some of
which we have touched on in earlier chapters:
• Continuing high levels of economic inactivity and numbers of
working age households that are jobless. The initial impact of
the ‘New Deals’ appears to have slowed (McKnight, 2005).
• Benefit incomes of those without children who are out of
work. The group in poverty that are deepest in poverty – have
the largest ‘poverty gap’ – are single adults without children,2
unsurprising given the level of their benefits in relation to the
poverty line shown in figure 21. Income Support for a single
Figure 23: Four forms of intervention
Focus of
intervention
Entry to adverse state





Risk of event Effects of event
Intervention to change
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adult is now lower than the support given for a family’s first
child – and the gap will widen since the former is price linked,
but the latter earnings linked.
• The very low wages of many women working part-time.
• Achievement levels in secondary schools in poor areas.
• Particularly high rates of poverty among particular groups –
for instance, those from certain ethnic minorities, and
disabled people – reflecting a mixture of problems
encompassing both discrimination and levels of skills and
qualifications.
• Pensioners who fail to take up the income that should be
guaranteed by the ‘guarantee credit’ in Pension Credit,
particularly older women.
An optimistic view
Looking ahead it is possible to take optimistic or pessimistic
views of how policy towards poverty will develop over the next
20 years. On an optimistic view, policies will begin to establish
a virtuous circle, as measures aimed at tackling the causes of
poverty start to change underlying inequalities, reducing the
numbers dependent on state assistance, and so freeing up
resources to allow more generous treatment of those who
remain so and the extension of policies to cover current gaps.
Thus if policies succeeded in raising the skills of disadvantaged
young people and in reducing the economic disconnection of
the most disadvantaged areas, incomes from work of the
otherwise poor would rise, and the costs of social security
benefits and tax credits for them would fall. This could liberate
resources3 to improve the value of benefits to those receiving
them, also reinforcing the political will to do so, backed by the
public desire for governments to reduce poverty discussed in
chapter 7. While the demographic pressures on social spending
will be upwards, reductions in economic inactivity, increases in
the average age of retirement,4 and ‘healthy ageing’ would
make them easier to cope with. This could make possible a
more general strategy of ‘progressive universalism’ under
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which social provision improves for all, but most for the poor,
making gradually rising taxation acceptable – all taxpayers
would be getting something for their money, while seeing
poverty falling.
A pessimistic view
On a bleaker, pessimistic view, any success in tackling
underlying inequalities would come too slowly to counter
continuing polarisation of economic opportunities. Those
without access to capital, home ownership and good education
for their children would fall further behind – widening wealth
inequalities would continue to reinforce intergenerational
links, for instance as those with most wealth purchase houses
near good schools. Even if policy succeeded in raising the skills
of some young people, the lowest wages would still be set by
an increasingly cut-throat global market. While the rising cost
of policies to ameliorate the effects of growing market
inequality on relative incomes (such as the new tax credits)
would be visible, progress in reducing poverty would be slow or
non-existent, and political support for pushing such strategies
further would be weakened. Rapid increases in age related
demands on social spending could mean that taxes would have
to rise, but without taxpayers seeing what they were getting
for their money, squeezing the political headroom for more
resources to tackle poverty, and pushing governments further
back into means tested programmes with incomplete take-up,
disincentive effects and weak political support. Reinforcing the
latter, if the poor are seen as ‘other’ it is easy to stir up
prejudice, as we saw in Britain in the nineteenth century, and as
has been suggested as a reason for differences in attitudes to
poverty policy in the US and Europe.5
Rowntree’s own conclusion
There is no easy way of saying which of these scenarios is the
more likely. But we are more likely to establish a virtuous circle
if the need for progress on reducing poverty has a high public
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and political profile. Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree
showed that sound evidence was one answer to prejudice
about the poor. ‘Lifting the curtain’ and shining an honest light
on reality in the poorest parts of our society is a contribution
social scientists can continue to make. 
Britain was the first country to develop poverty measures,
and the science has a distinguished and influential history in
this country. The early poverty researchers were businessmen
who were concerned enough about social problems to devote
their spare time to investigating them. Their successors have
been academic sociologists, statisticians, economists and civil
servants, all attempting to produce rigorous research into this
thorny and complex problem. Good policy making requires
solid facts to go on, but definitions of poverty are invariably
subjective and can alter our impressions of the magnitude or
source of the problem. Different methods lead to different
results, but a general picture of the historical trends and current
situation emerges. It is pessimistic in that Britain had very high
poverty rates for the last 15 years of the twentieth century and
still has higher poverty rates than most other European
countries. It is almost inevitable that parts of society become
disaffected as a result. But it is optimistic in that poverty was
much reduced by the Beveridge reforms, full employment and
by the sharing of national prosperity with those living on
benefits in the 1960s and 1970s. Recent reforms and the decline
in unemployment have also led to a reduction in poverty,
particularly in child poverty. This all suggests that, if the
political will is there, there is no reason why policies cannot be
as effective today in further reducing poverty as they were in
the past. Rowntree’s own conclusion from a century ago
remains apposite:
That in this land of abounding wealth, during a time of
perhaps unexampled prosperity, probably more than one
fourth of the population are living in poverty, is a fact
which may well cause great searchings of heart. There is
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surely need for a greater concentration of thought by the
nation upon the wellbeing of its own people, for no
civilization can be sound or stable which has at its base this
mass of stunted human life. The suffering may be all but
voiceless, and we may long remain ignorant of its extent
and severity, but when once we realize it we see that social
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2 The context for Rowntree’s contribution
1 Assistance to the poor from local parishes under the Poor
Law.
3 Changes in poverty
1 These are analysed in Webb (2002).
2 For the benefit of younger readers, 12 pence (d) made one
shilling (s) and 20 shillings made one pound (£).
3 Hills (2001), p. 4 (see also chapter 7 below); Kilpatrick (1973);
Hagenaars and Van Praag (1985). 
4 Townsend’s alternative deprivation indicators approach has
many similarities to the budget standard method but
constructs the poverty line in a less transparent manner. 
4 Why has poverty changed?
1 Family Resources Survey data are Crown Copyright. For their
use acknowledgement is made to the Department of Social
Security, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Office
for National Statistics and the UK Data Archive.
2 Households were assigned to the first of the following
categories that they corresponded to: (1) widows; (2) head
above pension age or permanently sick or disabled; (3) head
unemployed; (4) four or more children; (5) in paid work; (6)
all others. Categories are close, but not exactly the same, for
the two years.
3 1901 Census, table 28; 2001 Census, table KS04; the base for
both years is all aged 16 and over.
4 1901 Census, table 36; 2001 Census, table KS04.
5 Family Spending 2001/02, Office for National Statistics, 2003.
6 Since earnings of the servant-keeping class are not recorded,
a low estimate of their earnings has been used to determine
this figure; if a higher estimate were made this would reduce
the figure.
173
7 Family Resources Survey, 2001/02.
8 Lakin (2003).
5 Poverty policy from 1900 to the 1970s
1 See a collection of retrospective views in Hills, Ditch and
Glennerster (1994).
6 The last quarter century
1 See Hills and Stewart (2005) for a comprehensive discussion
of policy since 1997 and its results.
2 For an assessment of the impact of these policies, see Lupton
and Power (2005).
3 Note that the indices for prices and earnings used by DWP in
these two series are applied at different points within the
year, so the two diagrams show slightly different patterns
over time.
4 Partly financed by the final abolition of the Married Couple’s
Allowance within income tax.
5 However, those whose incomes increase by only a relatively
small amount (£2,500 in 2003/04) do not in fact have their tax
credits cut back for the tax year when the increase occurs, so,
for a time, effective marginal tax rates are lower than the 70
per cent figure. Equally, under the 1997/98 system, Family
Credit was only adjusted every six months, so for some
income ranges the impact of changing incomes was also
delayed. 
6 For details of how the systems result in these outcomes, see
Hills (2004b).
7 In fact, many higher earners would have ‘contracted out’ of
SERPS and would receive part of the amount shown through
their occupational pension scheme in return for having paid 
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reduced National Insurance contributions while they were
working.
8 Again, many ‘contracted out’ higher earners would actually
receive less than this from the state, but would have had the
offsetting advantage of lower National Insurance
contributions when at work.
7 Policy challenges and dilemmas for the next 20 years
1 This section draws heavily on research by Kitty Stewart
(2005b).
2 Given the rapid reduction in child poverty in the UK against
this kind of standard since 1996/97 (see the lower part of
table 10), this position may well now have improved,
particularly by comparison with the US.
3 Stewart (2005b, fig. 14.13), using incomes before housing
costs and the OECD equivalence scale. As we saw in table 2
above, after housing costs and using the McClements
equivalence scale, 73 per cent of households with a chief
wage earner out of work were counted as poor in Britain in
2001/02.
4 See Darton, Hirsch and Strelitz (2003), fig. 30.
5 See, for instance, Park et al. (2003) for results from the 2002
survey, including a description of the survey and how it is
carried out in its appendices. For more detailed discussion of
some of the results discussed in this section, see Hills (2001,
2004a).
6 It is also true that when respondents were asked in 2001
what proportion of children were poor, the median response
was 25 per cent, also roughly in line with the official figures
for child poverty against the 60 per cent of median income
line (Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2002, appendix figure).
However, responses to other questions of this kind, such as
the proportion of social security going to unemployed
people, were a long way from the mark, so some might
temper the weight put on this finding.
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7 By contrast, in the US, when people were asked to choose
between two reasons for people living in need, 61 per cent
blamed laziness or lack of willpower rather than society
treating them unfairly (Hills, 2004a, p. 69, based on World
Values Survey results).
8 John Hills acted as Secretary to the Inquiry Group.
9 See Sassi (2005) for a discussion.
10See Hills (2004a), ch. 10, for a more detailed discussion, and
the first report of the Pensions Commission, chaired by Adair
Turner, published in October 2004, for a discussion of future
prospects for pensions.
11Wittenberg et al. (2004) show that there is a very large
‘funnel of doubt’ about future long term care costs, but the
upside risk is considerable. On one scenario, if age-specific
needs did not decline as life expectancy lengthens and care
standards improve moderately, then with current
demographic projections, total public and private long term
care costs could rise from 1.4 per cent of GDP now to 3.4 per
cent in 2051, with the state component rising from 0.9 to 2.3
per cent of GDP. If free personal care was extended from
Scotland across the UK, in this scenario, the public costs
would be another 0.75 per cent of GDP higher.
8 Poverty and progress for the next generation?
1 Hills and Stewart (2005), table 15.1.
2 Darton, Hirsch and Strelitz (2003), fig. 7.
3 Darton, Hirsch and Strelitz calculate that eradication of
poverty within 20 years would require incomes of the
poorest fifth to grow annually by 7 per cent per year, while
other incomes grew by 2.5 per cent (2003, p. 15). They
suggest that the aggregate ‘poverty gap’ to be closed is
equivalent to about a fortieth of national income, or about
a twentieth of expected gains from growth over the period.
If this was achieved simply through income transfers, the
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gross cost would be higher, of course, as it is hard to imagine
successful policies that would affect only the poorest.
4 See the first report of the Pensions Commission, published in
October 2004, for a discussion of the trade-offs between
future pensioner living standards, retirement ages and levels
of public and private pension contributions.
5 Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggest that in the US racial and
ethnic prejudices have been manipulated to support
judgemental views about the poor. In Europe such views
have been less judgemental, but the authors warn that the
rapidly changing ethnic and social mix may change this in
future.
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